Search results for "jel:C71"
showing 5 items of 5 documents
Strategic sharing of a costly network
2012
We study minimum cost spanning tree problems for a set of users connected to a source. Prim’s algorithm provides a way of finding the minimum cost tree mm. This has led to several definitions in the literature, regarding how to distribute the cost. These rules propose different cost allocations, which can be understood as compensations and/or payments between players, with respect to the status quo point: each user pays for the connection she uses to be linked to the source. In this paper we analyze the rationale behind a distribution of the minimum cost by defining an a priori transfer structure. Our first result states the existence of a transfer structure such that no user is willing to …
A strategic approach for the discounted Shapley values
2014
The family of discounted Shapley values is analyzed for cooperative games in coalitional form. We consider the bargaining protocol of the alternating random proposer introduced in Hart and Mas-Colell (Econometrica 64:357–380, 1996). We demonstrate that the discounted Shapley values arise as the expected payoffs associated with the bargaining equilibria when a time discount factor is considered. In a second model, we replace the time cost with the probability that the game ends without agreements. This model also implements these values in transferable utility games, moreover, the model implements the \(\alpha \)-consistent values in the nontransferable utility setting.
Solidarity in games with a coalition structure
2010
Abstract A new axiomatic characterization of the two-step Shapley value Kamijo (2009) is presented based on a solidarity principle of the members of any union: when the game changes due to the addition or deletion of players outside the union, all members of the union will share the same gains/losses.
Teoría de la Participación. Sugerencias analíticas
2002
Human groups may be analysed as organisations of networks of relationships between their members. This article proposes an exercise in theoretic speculation about participation and democracy based on the analytic tools of a relational-informational theory the bases of which come from evolutionalism and the Information Economy. This analytical framework may clarify the nature of macro-collective citizenship, micro-formal group of the company and the fabric of the emergent and informal communicative relations of society and the market. As a humanist heuristic which revindicates the resource to literary and philosophic sources of knowledge, work offers alternative explainations to the preferen…
Cooperación condicional y tercer sector
2000
The following paper analyzes the problem of social cooperation in the provision of a public good from an evolutionary perspective. To this end we depart from behavioral programs as the basic building block for modeling individuals in the social interaction, which is based on a generalized prisoners dilemma. In it, a population of individuals follow a conditional cooperative program, which some authors refer as to morality, and that we will show that is equivalent to the application of the principle of reciprocity. It will be shown that the degree of cooperation, that is the individual contribution toward the provision of the public good, is positive although sub-optimal. Finally, if we comp…