Search results for "jel:I11"

showing 2 items of 2 documents

Testing For Asymmetric Information In Insurance Markets With Unobservable Types

2008

In two important recent papers, Finkelstein and McGarry [25] and Finkelstein and Poterba [28] propose a new test for asymmetric information in insurance markets that considers explicitly unobserved heterogeneity in insurance demand. In this paper we propose an alternative implementation of the Finkelstein-McGarry-Poterba test based on the identification of unobservable types by use of finite mixture models. The actual implementation of our test follows some recent advances on marginal modelling as applied to latent class analysis; formal testing procedures for the null of asymmetric information and for the hypothesis that private information is indeed multidimensional can be performed by im…

Asymmetric Information Unobservable Types Latent Class Analysis Long Term Insurance Market.jel:D82jel:I11Asymmetric Information Unobservable Types Latent Class Analysis Long Term Insurance Marketjel:G22
researchProduct

Perception du risque dépendance et demande d'assurance : une analyse à partir de l'enquête PATER

2013

Dans la littérature économique, de nombreux travaux tentent d'expliquer pourquoi les individus s’assurent aussi peu contre la dépendance. Du côté de l’offre, différents freins possibles au développement du marché de l’assurance dépendance ont d’ores et déjà été pointés du doigt par la littérature. Les estimations récentes montrent néanmoins que les limites imputables à l’offre ne suffisent pas à expliquer le faible développement du marché : même si les assurances étaient moins coûteuses et les couvertures proposées plus larges, la majorité des individus ne souscrirait toujours pas d’assurance. Il est donc nécessaire d’aller trouver des explications du côté de la demande d’assurance dépendan…

jel:D81JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D1 - Household Behavior and Family Economics/D.D1.D10 - GeneralAssurance-invaliditéjel:D84JEL : I - Health Education and Welfare/I.I3 - Welfare Well-Being and Poverty/I.I3.I38 - Government Policy • Provision and Effects of Welfare Programsjel:G02[ QFIN ] Quantitative Finance [q-fin]JEL: J - Labor and Demographic Economics/J.J1 - Demographic Economics/J.J1.J14 - Economics of the Elderly • Economics of the Handicapped • Non-Labor Market DiscriminationJEL : D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information Knowledge and Uncertainty/D.D8.D81 - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertaintyperception du risqueaversion au risqueJEL : D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information Knowledge and Uncertainty/D.D8.D84 - Expectations • SpeculationsAssurance dépendance[QFIN]Quantitative Finance [q-fin]préférence pour le présentJEL: I - Health Education and Welfare/I.I3 - Welfare Well-Being and Poverty/I.I3.I38 - Government Policy • Provision and Effects of Welfare ProgramsJEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information Knowledge and Uncertainty/D.D8.D81 - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and UncertaintyAssurance-invalidité;jel:D10JEL : J - Labor and Demographic Economics/J.J1 - Demographic Economics/J.J1.J14 - Economics of the Elderly • Economics of the Handicapped • Non-Labor Market DiscriminationJEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information Knowledge and Uncertainty/D.D8.D84 - Expectations • Speculationsjel:I11[QFIN] Quantitative Finance [q-fin]jel:J14JEL: I - Health Education and Welfare/I.I1 - Health/I.I1.I11 - Analysis of Health Care Marketsjel:I13JEL : I - Health Education and Welfare/I.I1 - Health/I.I1.I11 - Analysis of Health Care Marketsjel:I38Assurance dépendance; perception du risque; préférence pour le présent; aversion au risque;JEL : D - Microeconomics/D.D1 - Household Behavior and Family Economics/D.D1.D10 - General
researchProduct