Search results for "jel:J41"

showing 3 items of 3 documents

Employment protection : its effects on different skill groups and on the incentive to become skilled

2005

Summary Employment protection affects labour market outcomes and hence the incentive to acquire skills. Using a matching model with two education levels in which workers decide ex-ante on their skill formation, it is shown that employment protection can raise the fraction of skilled workers. This will be the case if workers obtain a sufficiently large fraction of the rent created by skill formation. Furthermore, it will be shown that high-skilled workers face shorter unemployment duration and lower dismissal probabilities.

Economics and EconometricsMatching (statistics)Labour economicsmedia_common.quotation_subjecteducationeducation employment protection unemployment search and matching modelsjel:J64jel:J42General Business Management and Accountingbehavioral disciplines and activitiesjel:J41jel:J68jel:J24IncentiveDismissalUnemploymentEconomicsDuration (project management)Social Sciences (miscellaneous)media_common
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Financing Unemployment Benefits: Dismissal versus Employment Taxes

2006

This paper investigates the effects of using dismissal taxes to finance unemployment benefits. We compare dismissal and employment taxes in a model with search frictions. Employment taxes give rise to externalities because firms do not take into account the effects their dismissal decisions have on others. By introducing dismissal taxes to finance unemployment insurance, these externalities can partly be internalized. Taking into account the budget of the unemployment insurance, employment taxes can be reduced by more than necessary to offset the adverse effect of dismissal taxes on the firm value. The introduction of dismissal taxes leads to higher job creation and lower unemployment, in c…

FinanceJob creationLabour economicsFull employmentbusiness.industrymedia_common.quotation_subjectGeography Planning and Developmentemployment protection search and matching models unemployment unemployment insurancejel:J64jel:J65jel:J41jel:J68DismissalUnemploymentValue (economics)EconomicsbusinessExternalityDemographymedia_commonLabour
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The workers' value of the remaining employment contract duration

2005

We introduce and apply a method for estimating workers' marginal willingness to pay for job attributes employing data on job search activity. Worker's willingness to pay for the remaining duration of the employment contract is derived. We provide evidence that workers attach substantial value to the remaining contract duration. A temporary worker with a remaining contract of six months is willing to pay about 10% of the monthly wage to increase the contract by one month.This discussion paper has resulted in a publication in Economica, 2008, 75(297), 116-39.

jel:J3jel:P23jel:J6On-the-job search; Job attributes; Contract duration; Temporary jobjel:J31jel:J41
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