Search results for "jel:Q20"

showing 3 items of 3 documents

On the Coincidence of the Feedback Nash and Stackelberg Equilibria in Economic Applications of Differential Games

2002

In this paper the scope of the applicability of the Stackelberg equilibrium concept in differential games is investigated. Firstly, conditions for obtaining the coincidence between the Stackelberg and Nash equilibria are defined in terms of the instantaneous pay-off function and the state equation of the game. Secondly, it is showed that for a class of differential games with state-interdependence both equilibria are identical independently of the player being the leader of the game. A survey of different economic models shows that this coincidence is going to occur for a good number of economic applications of differential games. This result appears because of the continuous-time setting i…

Computer Science::Computer Science and Game TheoryCorrelated equilibriumMathematical optimizationjel:D62Differential Games; Stationary Feedback Nash Equilibrium; Stationary Feedback Stackelberg Equilibrium; Coincidence.ComputingMilieux_PERSONALCOMPUTINGjel:C73Trembling hand perfect equilibriumjel:H41Differential games stationary feedback Nash equilibrium stationary feedback Stackelberg equilibrium.symbols.namesakeEquilibrium selectionNash equilibriumBest responsejel:Q20jel:Q30Repeated gameEconomicsStackelberg competitionsymbolsEpsilon-equilibriumMathematical economicsSSRN Electronic Journal
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Self-enforcing international environmental agreements revisited

2004

In Barrett's (1994) paper on transboundary pollution abatement is shown that if the signatories of an international environmental agreement act in a Stackelberg fashion, then, depending on parameter values, a self-enforcing IEA can have any number of signatories between two and the grand coalition. Barrett obtains this result using numerical simulations and also ignoring the fact that emissions must be non-negative. Recent attempts to use analytical approaches and to explicitly recognize the non-negativity constraints have suggested that the number of signatories of a stable IEA may be very small. The way such papers have dealt with non-negativity constraints is to restrict parameter values…

international externalities self-enforcing environmental agreements Stackelberg equilibrium non-negative emissions constraintsEconomics and EconometricsPublic economicsjel:D62jel:C72Transboundary pollutionjel:F02Grand coalitionMicroeconomicsrestrictjel:Q20Key (cryptography)EconomicsStackelberg competitionOxford Economic Papers
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Panorámica de la problemática medioambiental en el mundo y en España

2008

As energy resources become scarce and pollution increases, fundamental and often irreversible changes are affecting our global ecosystem, and these changes are already having an influence on countries’ potential for economic growth and development. In this article we examine the principal environmental problems worldwide and how such problems are affected by inequality between countries. In Spain’s case, the basic problems are greenhouse gas emissions, problems relating to water management and issues concerning territory and biodiversity. We also call for the application of economic funding mechanisms to implement environmental policies.

jel:Q32jel:Q20jel:Q25jel:Q01Environmental problems inequality and the environment climate change water management biodiversity.CIRIEC-España, revista de economía pública, social y cooperativa
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