Search results for "lennonjohto"
showing 3 items of 3 documents
GDL90fuzz: Fuzzing - GDL-90 Data Interface Specification Within Aviation Software and Avionics Devices–A Cybersecurity Pentesting Perspective
2022
As the core part of next-generation air transportation systems, the Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) is becoming very popular. However, many (if not most) ADS-B devices and implementations support and rely on Garmin’s GDL-90 protocol for data exchange and encapsulation. In this paper, we research GDL-90 protocol fuzzing options and demonstrate practical Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks on popular Electronic Flight Bag (EFB) software operating on mobile devices. For this purpose, we specifically configured our own avionics pentesting platform. and targeted the popular Garmin’s GDL-90 protocol as the industry-leading devices operate on it. We captured legitimate traffic from …
On the (In)Security of 1090ES and UAT978 Mobile Cockpit Information Systems : An Attacker Perspective on the Availability of ADS-B Safety- and Missio…
2022
Automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) is a key air surveillance technology and a critical component of next-generation air transportation systems. It significantly simplifies aircraft surveillance technology and improves airborne traffic situational awareness. Many types of mobile cockpit information systems (MCISs) are based on ADS-B technology. MCIS gives pilots the flight and traffic-related information they need. MCIS has two parts: an ADS-B transceiver and an electronic flight bag (EFB) application. The ADS-B transceivers transmit and receive the ADS-B radio signals while the EFB applications hosted on mobile phones display the data. Because they are cheap, lightweight, an…
Cybersecurity Attacks on Software Logic and Error Handling Within ADS-B Implementations: Systematic Testing of Resilience and Countermeasures
2022
Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) is a cornerstone of the next-generation digital sky and is now mandated in several countries. However, there have been many reports of serious security vulnerabilities in the ADS-B architecture. In this paper, we demonstrate and evaluate the impact of multiple cyberattacks on ADS-B via remote radio frequency links that affected various network, processing, and display subsystems used within the ADS-B ecosystem. Overall we implemented and tested 12 cyberattacks on ADS-B in a controlled environment, out of which 5 attacks were presented or implemented for the first time. For all these attacks, we developed a unique testbed that consisted of 1…