Search results for "microeconomics"

showing 10 items of 442 documents

Biproportion et offre dominante (A propos de l'article d'André Torre ‘Sur la signification théorique du modèle d'offre multisectoriel')

1996

One replies here to partisans of the reject of the supply-driven model in input-output analysis and especially to A. Torre (Revue Economique, 5, 44, 951-970). First of all, demand-driven hypothesis (Leontief) and supply-driven hypothesis (Ghosh) are symmetrical and incompatible, what forbidden to reject the second to the motive that it depends on the first. Secondly, the results earlier obtained for France of 1970 to 1985 from the method of the biproportionnal filter show that there is so much instability in the long term in the columns than in the rows of the flow matrix. Thirdly, the assimilation of the usage of allocation coefficients to the adoption of the supply-side model is excessive.

JEL : C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C6 - Mathematical Methods • Programming Models • Mathematical and Simulation Modeling/C.C6.C67 - Input–Output ModelsSupply-drivenJEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C6 - Mathematical Methods • Programming Models • Mathematical and Simulation Modeling/C.C6.C67 - Input–Output ModelsOffre dominanteInput-outputJEL : D - Microeconomics/D.D5 - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium/D.D5.D57 - Input–Output Tables and Analysis[ SHS.ECO ] Humanities and Social Sciences/Economies and financesLeontiefJEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D5 - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium/D.D5.D57 - Input–Output Tables and Analysis[SHS.ECO] Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance[SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and FinanceGeneral Economics Econometrics and FinanceGhosh
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A Note on Qualitative Input-Output Analysis

1995

International audience; The paper discusses qualitative input—output methods. It is shown that information is lost. Because the binaiy relationship constructed by qualitative methods is not transitive, the model lacks economic consistency. Qualitative methods are tending to become more sophisticated, but some problems of economic interpretation are raised.

JEL : C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C6 - Mathematical Methods • Programming Models • Mathematical and Simulation Modeling/C.C6.C67 - Input–Output ModelstopologyJEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C6 - Mathematical Methods • Programming Models • Mathematical and Simulation Modeling/C.C6.C67 - Input–Output ModelsJEL : D - Microeconomics/D.D5 - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium/D.D5.D57 - Input–Output Tables and Analysis[ SHS.ECO ] Humanities and Social Sciences/Economies and financesQualitative input-outputJEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D5 - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium/D.D5.D57 - Input–Output Tables and Analysis[SHS.ECO] Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance[SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance
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Is the French mobile phone cartel really a cartel?

2009

International audience; France Telecom (FT), SFR and Bouygues Telecom (BT) have been fined by France's Conseil de la Concurrence (CC) for organizing a mobile phone cartel with stable market shares (one-half, one-third and one-sixth, respectively) and for directly exchanging commercial information. While not contesting the legal decision, it is argued here that the economic reasoning is flawed. (1) As the CC made much of the firms' stable market shares, we have first followed this line of reasoning by considering that the market shares are quotas under uniform costs. Even if there is a general incentive to form a monopolistic cartel, BT was too small for it to be worth its while to join it; it i…

JEL : K - Law and Economics/K.K2 - Regulation and Business Law/K.K2.K21 - Antitrust LawEconomics and EconometricsCournotJEL: L - Industrial Organization/L.L1 - Market Structure Firm Strategy and Market Performance/L.L1.L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect MarketsStackelbergMobile telephonyCartelJEL L13 L41 L96 D43 K21Management Science and Operations ResearchCournot competitionIndustrial and Manufacturing EngineeringMicroeconomicsCompetition (economics)Monopolistic competitionJEL : L - Industrial Organization/L.L1 - Market Structure Firm Strategy and Market Performance/L.L1.L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect MarketsEconomicsStackelberg competition[ SHS.ECO ] Humanities and Social Sciences/Economies and financesMarket shareGSMARCEPJEL : D - Microeconomics/D.D4 - Market Structure Pricing and Design/D.D4.D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market ImperfectionCartel[SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and FinanceGeneral Business Management and AccountingJEL : L - Industrial Organization/L.L9 - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities/L.L9.L96 - TelecommunicationsJEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D4 - Market Structure Pricing and Design/D.D4.D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market ImperfectionJEL: K - Law and Economics/K.K2 - Regulation and Business Law/K.K2.K21 - Antitrust LawJEL: L - Industrial Organization/L.L9 - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities/L.L9.L96 - TelecommunicationsJEL : L - Industrial Organization/L.L4 - Antitrust Issues and Policies/L.L4.L41 - Monopolization • Horizontal Anticompetitive PracticesConseil de la ConcurrenceIncentiveMonopolyMobile phoneJEL: L - Industrial Organization/L.L4 - Antitrust Issues and Policies/L.L4.L41 - Monopolization • Horizontal Anticompetitive PracticesInternational Journal of Production Economics
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Normalizing biproportional methods

2002

International audience; Biproportional methods are used to update matrices: the projection of a matrix Z to give it the column and row sums of another matrix is R Z S, where R and S are diagonal and secure the constraints of the problem (R and S have no signification at all because they are not identified). However, normalizing R or S generates important mathematical difficulties: it amounts to put constraints on Lagrange multipliers, non negativity (and so the existence of the solution) is not guaranteed at equilibrium or along the path to equilibrium.

JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C6 - Mathematical Methods • Programming Models • Mathematical and Simulation Modeling/C.C6.C67 - Input–Output Modelsjel:C63Diagonaljel:C67JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D5 - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium/D.D5.D57 - Input–Output Tables and Analysismathematical economicsColumn (database)Projection (linear algebra)Combinatoricssymbols.namesakeMatrix (mathematics)JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C6 - Mathematical Methods • Programming Models • Mathematical and Simulation Modeling/C.C6.C63 - Computational Techniques • Simulation ModelingmatricesJEL : D - Microeconomics/D.D5 - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium/D.D5.D57 - Input–Output Tables and Analysis[ SHS.ECO ] Humanities and Social Sciences/Economies and financesNon negativity[SHS.ECO] Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and FinanceGeneral Environmental ScienceMathematicsJEL : C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C6 - Mathematical Methods • Programming Models • Mathematical and Simulation Modeling/C.C6.C67 - Input–Output ModelsGeneral Social Sciences[SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Financejel:D57community developmentJEL : C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C6 - Mathematical Methods • Programming Models • Mathematical and Simulation Modeling/C.C6.C63 - Computational Techniques • Simulation ModelingLagrange multiplierPath (graph theory)symbols
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Managerial Behavior in the Lab: Information Disclosure, Decision Process and Leadership Style

2019

This paper reports the results from a lab experiment in which subjects playing the manager role can implement either an efficient / inegalitarian allocation or an inefficient / egalitarian allocation of payoffs. The experiment simulates a stylized managerial context by allowing the manager to manipulate information and select the decision process and by allowing the stakeholders to retaliate against the manager given different choices in the decision process. We found that the inefficient allocation is often selected and that this choice depends on whether the employees can retaliate against the manager and on whether the manager can hide information about the payoffs. The social preference…

JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments/C.C9.C92 - Laboratory Group BehaviorStylized factDecision process050208 financeManagerial decisionAsymmetric informationProcess (engineering)Management style.05 social sciencesStochastic gameManagement stylesCommunication strategyContext (language use)JEL: M - Business Administration and Business Economics • Marketing • Accounting • Personnel Economics/M.M1 - Business Administration/M.M1.M12 - Personnel Management • Executives; Executive Compensation[SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and FinanceSocial preferencesMicroeconomicsInformation asymmetry0502 economics and businessJEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D3 - Distribution/D.D3.D39 - OtherLeadership styleBusiness050207 economics[SHS.ECO] Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance
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Dimensions et dynamique de la coordination des soins de ville : une analyse économique

2019

Cet article vise à clarifier la notion de coordination en santé, à expliciter ses différentes dimensions et à revenir sur son statut dans un processus de production de soins. Une appréhension plus fine de la coordination permet de mieux analyser le bien-fondé, les difficultés des coordinations promues par les politiques de santé. Nous nous appuyons à la fois sur des études de terrain menées auprès de réseaux, de dispositifs de télémédecine et de MSP, et sur des approches théoriques de la coordination couvrant différents courants de l’économie des organisations.

JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D2 - Production and OrganizationsJEL: I - Health Education and Welfare/I.I1 - Health/I.I1.I11 - Analysis of Health Care Markets[SDV.SPEE] Life Sciences [q-bio]/Santé publique et épidémiologie[SDV.SPEE]Life Sciences [q-bio]/Santé publique et épidémiologie[SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance[SHS.ECO] Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance
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Wine - investment: a profitable alternative investment or a simple long term pleasure?

2014

International audience; The purpose of this work is twofold: - to make a first historic analysis of performance through an investment in wine by comparing its performance with those that would have been possible to obtain at the same time by providing financial term investments; - to introduce the regional diversity of performance by considering the situation in the three selected geographic areas.

JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D4 - Market Structure Pricing and Design/D.D4.D44 - AuctionsJEL: Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics • Environmental and Ecological Economics/Q.Q1 - Agriculture/Q.Q1.Q11 - Aggregate Supply and Demand Analysis • PricesJEL : G - Financial Economics/G.G1 - General Financial Markets/G.G1.G11 - Portfolio Choice • Investment DecisionsJEL: G - Financial Economics/G.G1 - General Financial Markets/G.G1.G11 - Portfolio Choice • Investment Decisions[ SHS.ECO ] Humanities and Social Sciences/Economies and finances[SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance[SHS.ECO] Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and FinanceJEL : Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics • Environmental and Ecological Economics/Q.Q1 - Agriculture/Q.Q1.Q11 - Aggregate Supply and Demand Analysis • PricesJEL : D - Microeconomics/D.D4 - Market Structure Pricing and Design/D.D4.D44 - Auctions
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Le paradoxe du seuil de pauvreté endogène dans les indices de pauvreté

2007

JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D6 - Welfare Economics/D.D6.D63 - Equity Justice Inequality and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement[ SHS.ECO ] Humanities and Social Sciences/Economies and finances[SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance[SHS.ECO] Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and FinanceJEL : D - Microeconomics/D.D3 - Distribution/D.D3.D31 - Personal Income Wealth and Their DistributionsJEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D3 - Distribution/D.D3.D31 - Personal Income Wealth and Their DistributionsJEL : I - Health Education and Welfare/I.I3 - Welfare Well-Being and Poverty/I.I3.I32 - Measurement and Analysis of PovertyJEL: I - Health Education and Welfare/I.I3 - Welfare Well-Being and Poverty/I.I3.I32 - Measurement and Analysis of PovertyJEL : D - Microeconomics/D.D6 - Welfare Economics/D.D6.D63 - Equity Justice Inequality and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
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The assignment of powers in an open-ended European Union

2003

Presented at CESIFO Conference “A Constitution for the EU”, February 2003; International audience; A major characteristic of the European Union is its transitional or evolving nature, in particular with regard to the assignment of powers between the two main levels of government. More precisely, under current constitutional arrangements, this evolving nature takes the form of an integration process which tends to be monotonous, that is, which can only with great difficulty be reversed. The paper is mainly devoted to the explanation of how this comes about and what effects this has on other features of the process. As a concluding remark, however, it suggests that an additional criterion for…

JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making/D.D7.D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking Lobbying Elections Legislatures and Voting BehaviorJEL: H - Public Economics/H.H7 - State and Local Government • Intergovernmental Relations/H.H7.H77 - Intergovernmental Relations • Federalism • SecessionEuropean uniontransitiongradualism[SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and FinanceconstitutionConstitutionJEL: F - International Economics/F.F0 - General/F.F0.F02 - International Economic Order and IntegrationEuropean integration European union constitution gradualism transitionEuropean Integrationddc:330[ SHS.ECO ] Humanities and Social Sciences/Economies and financesEuropean UnionEuropean integration[SHS.ECO] Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and FinanceGradualism
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Horizontal competition in multilevel governmental settings

2013

28 pages; Governments situated on the same level of a multi-level governmental system compete with each other as well as with governments placed higher or lower. This paper is concerned with horizontal competition only. It discusses both competition based on the mobility of agents and competition based on comparisons of performance across jurisdictions - i.e., yardstick competition. With regard to the first kind, the focus is on the capacity of governments and voters to decide policies in spite of the mobility of agents. Some attention is also given to non-standard mechanisms in which mobility is manipulated so as to change the structure of the electorate. The paper considers two forms of h…

JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making/D.D7.D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking Lobbying Elections Legislatures and Voting BehaviordecentralizationContext (language use)DecentralizationJEL : H - Public Economics/H.H7 - State and Local Government • Intergovernmental Relations/H.H7.H77 - Intergovernmental Relations • Federalism • SecessionCompetition (economics)YardstickPolitical science[ SHS.ECO ] Humanities and Social Sciences/Economies and finances[SHS.ECO] Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and FinanceComputingMilieux_MISCELLANEOUSJEL : H - Public Economics/H.H7 - State and Local Government • Intergovernmental Relations/H.H7.H70 - GeneralGovernmentHierarchyCompetitionPublic economicsJEL: H - Public Economics/H.H7 - State and Local Government • Intergovernmental Relations/H.H7.H77 - Intergovernmental Relations • Federalism • SecessionJEL: H - Public Economics/H.H7 - State and Local Government • Intergovernmental Relations/H.H7.H70 - General[SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Financeyardstick competitionMultilevel governmental settingsSpiteJEL : D - Microeconomics/D.D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making/D.D7.D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking Lobbying Elections Legislatures and Voting Behaviordecentralizationintergovernmental competitionyardstick competitionPublic financeintergovernmental competition
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