Search results for "referentiality"
showing 5 items of 5 documents
Abstract. Towards a Theory of Cognitive Responsibility: Action, Perception and Normativity from Plato to Searle.
2011
The talk articulates the normative commitments allowing us to consider perceptual experience as a form of knowledge - that is, as a form of the human activity situated in the normative space of reason of which we can be held responsible. More specifically, John Searle's characterization of the logical structure of perceptual experiences as causally selfreferential intentional states can be developed into an account of the causal and normative-intentional aspects of experience, the genealogy of which can be traced back to Plato's Theaetetus and Meno. In these dialogues, in fact, a picture of experience as "knowledge" seems to be based on a specific "reasoning about the cause" as the specific…
Is recursion language-specific? Evidence of recursive mechanisms in the structure of intentional action
2014
In their 2002 seminal paper Hauser, Chomsky and Fitch hypothesize that recursion is the only human-specific and language-specific mechanism of the faculty of language. While debate focused primarily on the meaning of recursion in the hypothesis and on the human-specific and syntax-specific character of recursion, the present work focuses on the claim that recursion is language-specific. We argue that there are recursive structures in the domain of motor intentionality by way of extending John R. Searle's analysis of intentional action. We then discuss evidence from cognitive science and neuroscience supporting the claim that motor-intentional recursion is language-independent and suggest so…
Perception, Normativity and Action in Contemporary Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Science
Working on the background of a view of mind as “in action”, as pragmatically shaped by its own dynamic interactions with the world, emerging from the achievements of contemporary philosophy of mind (from Searle to enactivism)and cognitive science (from Gibson to Goodale and Milner)I aim to propose a view of perception as a form of human activity of which we are responsible, and in which our “commitment” to truth and rationality can take place. Against some recent phenomenalist and antirepresentationalist views of perception I'll try to show that the action-oriented character of perception does not challenge its rational constraint to a right representation of the state of affairs which it i…