Search results for "response"

Protective effect of paraoxonase-2 against endoplasmic reticulum stress-induced apoptosis is lost upon disturbance of calcium homoeostasis

2008

PON2 (paraoxonase-2) is a ubiquitously expressed antioxidative protein which is largely found in the ER (endoplasmic reticulum). Addressing the cytoprotective functions of PON2, we observed that PON2 overexpression provided significant resistance to ER-stress-induced caspase 3 activation when the ER stress was induced by interference with protein modification (by tunicamycin or dithiothreitol), but not when ER stress was induced by disturbance of Ca2+ homoeostasis (by thapsigargin or A23187). When analysing the underlying molecular events, we found an activation of the PON2 promoter in response to all tested ER-stress-inducing stimuli. However, only tunicamycin and dithiothreitol resulted i…

Modulation of intracellular calcium concentrations and T cell activation by prickly pear polyphenols.

2004

Opuntia ficus indica (prickly pear) polyphenolic compounds (OFPC) triggered an increase in [Ca2+]i in human Jurkat T-cell lines. Furthermore, OFPC-induced rise in [Ca2+]i was significantly curtailed in calcium-free buffer (0% Ca2+) as compared to that in 100% Ca2+ medium. Preincubation of cells with tyrphostin A9, an inhibitor of Ca2+ release-activated Ca2+ (CRAC) channels, significantly diminished the OFPC-induced sustained response on the increases in [Ca2+]i. Lanthanum and nifedipine, the respective inhibitors of voltage-dependent and L-type calcium channels, failed to curtail significantly the OFPC-induced calcium response. As OFPC still stimulated increases in [Ca2+]i in 0% Ca2+ medium…

Guilty Knowledge- testi valheenpaljastustestinä : Tarina- proseduuria käyttäen saadut tulokset kahdella eri pisteytysmenetelmällä

1997

Consensus in Noncooperative Dynamic Games: a Multi-Retailer Inventory Application

2008

We focus on Nash equilibria and Pareto optimal Nash equilibria for a finite horizon noncooperative dynamic game with a special structure of the stage cost. We study the existence of these solutions by proving that the game is a potential game. For the single-stage version of the game, we characterize the aforementioned solutions and derive a consensus protocol that makes the players converge to the unique Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium. Such an equilibrium guarantees the interests of the players and is also social optimal in the set of Nash equilibria. For the multistage version of the game, we present an algorithm that converges to Nash equilibria, unfortunately, not necessarily Pareto op…

Distributed Consensus in Noncooperative Inventory Games

2009

This paper deals with repeated nonsymmetric congestion games in which the players cannot observe their payoffs at each stage. Examples of applications come from sharing facilities by multiple users. We show that these games present a unique Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium that dominates all other Nash equilibria and consequently it is also the social optimum among all equilibria, as it minimizes the sum of all the players’ costs. We assume that the players adopt a best response strategy. At each stage, they construct their belief concerning others probable behavior, and then, simultaneously make a decision by optimizing their payoff based on their beliefs. Within this context, we provide a …

Consensus in inventory games

2008

This paper studies design, convergence, stability and optimality of a distributed consensus protocol for n-player repeated non cooperative games under incomplete information. Information available to each player concerning the other players' strategies evolves in time. At each stage (time period), the players select myopically their best binary strategy on the basis of a payoff, defined on a single stage, monotonically decreasing with the number of active players. The game is specialized to an inventory application, where fixed costs are shared among all retailers, interested in reordering or not from a common warehouse. As information evolves in time, the number of active players changes t…

Existence and Optimality of Nash Equilibria in Inventory Games

2005

Abstract This paper studies the stability and optimality of a distributed consensus protocol for n -player repeated non cooperative games under incomplete information. At each stage, the players choose binary strategies and incur in a payoff monotonically decreasing with the number of active players. The game is specialized to an inventory application, where fixed costs are shared among all retailers, interested in whether reordering or not from a common warehouse. The authors focus on Pareto optimality as a measure of coordination of reordering strategies, proving that there exists a unique Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium that verifies certain stability conditions.

Heterogeneous network games: Conflicting preferences

2013

Proceeding at: 2nd Annual UECE Lisbon Meeting: Game Theory and Applications, took place 2010, November, 4-6, in Lisbon (Portugal). The event Web site http://pascal.iseg.utl.pt/~uece/lisbonmeetings2010/ In many economic situations, a player pursues coordination or anti-coordination with her neighbors on a network, but she also has intrinsic preferences among the available options. We here introduce a model which allows to analyze this issue by means of a simple framework in which players endowed with an idiosyncratic identity interact on a social network through strategic complements or substitutes. We classify the possible types of Nash equilibria under complete information, finding two thr…

Noncooperative dynamic games for inventory applications: A consensus approach

2008

We focus on a finite horizon noncooperative dynamic game where the stage cost of a single player associated to a decision is a monotonically nonincreasing function of the total number of players making the same decision. For the single-stage version of the game, we characterize Nash equilibria and derive a consensus protocol that makes the players converge to the unique Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium. Such an equilibrium guarantees the interests of the players and is also social optimal in the set of Nash equilibria. For the multi-stage version of the game, we present an algorithm that converges to Nash equilibria, unfortunately not necessarily Pareto optimal. The algorithm returns a seque…

Mean Field Linear Quadratic Games with Set Up Costs

2013

This paper studies linear quadratic games with set up costs monotonic on the number of active players, namely, players whose action is non-null. Such games arise naturally in joint replenishment inventory systems. Building upon a preliminary analysis of the properties of the best response strategies and Nash equilibria for the given game, the main contribution is the study of the same game under large population. We also analyze the influence of an additional disturbance in the spirit of the literature on H∞ control. Numerical illustrations are provided. © 2012 Springer Science+Business Media New York.