0000000000008643
AUTHOR
Juan Carlos Santos
showing 5 related works from this author
The Serial Property and Restricted Balanced Contributions in discrete cost sharing problems
2006
We show that the Serial Poperty and Restricted Balanced Contributions characterize the subsidy-free serial cost sharing method (Moulin (1995)) in discrete cost allocation problems.
A value for multichoice games
2000
Abstract A multichoice game is a generalization of a cooperative TU game in which each player has several activity levels. We study the solution for these games proposed by Van Den Nouweland et al. (1995) [Van Den Nouweland, A., Potters, J., Tijs, S., Zarzuelo, J.M., 1995. Cores and related solution concepts for multi-choice games. ZOR-Mathematical Methods of Operations Research 41, 289–311]. We show that this solution applied to the discrete cost sharing model coincides with the Aumann-Shapley method proposed by Moulin (1995) [Moulin, H., 1995. On additive methods to share joint costs. The Japanese Economic Review 46, 303–332]. Also, we show that the Aumann-Shapley value for continuum game…
The multichoice consistent value
2000
We consider multichoice NTU games, i.e., cooperative NTU games in which players can participate in the game with several levels of activity. For these games, we define and characterize axiomatically the multichoice consistent value, which is a generalization of the consistent NTU value for NTU games and of the multichoice value for multichoice TU games. Moreover, we show that this value coincides with the consistent NTU value of a replicated NTU game and we provide a probabilistic interpretation.
Weighted weak semivalues
2000
We introduce two new value solutions: weak semivalues and weighted weak semivalues. They are subfamilies of probabilistic values, and they appear by adding the axioms of balanced contributions and weighted balanced contributions respectively. We show that the effect of the introduction of these axioms is the appearance of consistency in the beliefs of players about the game.
Prices in Mixed Cost Allocation Problems
2001
Abstract We consider mixed cost allocation problems, i.e., joint cost problems that involve two types of heterogeneous outputs, divisible and indivisible. The Aumann–Shapley price mechanism is extended to this setting. We also present a set of properties which characterize this cost sharing rule. Journal of Economic Literature Classification numbers: D63, C79.