0000000000082676
AUTHOR
Otto Toivanen
Politics and Procurement: Evidence from Cleaning Contracts
We study the effects of politics on public procurement in Swedish municipalities in 199098 using data on cleaning services. No procuring municipality committed to a standard auction format or to an ...
Income Inequality and Technology Diffusion: Evidence from Developing Countries*
We study the effect of within-country income inequality on the diffusion of mobile phones using data on market penetration in a sample of developing countries from 1985 to 1998. Mobile phones are an example of international technology, originating in industrialized countries and diffusing worldwide. We find that income inequality, as measured by the income share of the highest earning deciles, has a positive effect on the early diffusion of mobile phones and that the estimated effect becomes greater when a measure of agricultural endowments is used as an instrument. The instrumental variable results are robust to weak instruments. Our findings suggest that the diffusion of new technologies …
Monitoring and Market Power in Loan Markets
Whether or not banks are engaged in ex ante monitoring of customers may have important consequences for the whole economy. We approach this question via a model in which banks can invest in either information acquisition or market power (product differentiation). The two alternatives generate different predictions, which are tested using panel data on Finnish local banks. We find evidence that banks’ investments in branch networks and human capital (personnel) contribute to information acquisition but not to market power. We also find that managing customers’ money transactions enhances banks ability to control their lending risks.
Demand for and Pricing of Mobile Internet: Evidence from a Real-World Pricing Experiment
Commercialization of innovations frequently stumbles. A prominent recent example are the early (i.e. pre3G)mobile phone-enabled Internet services, whose European takeup was slower than expected. To determine why, we build a structural model of demand for such services and estimate it using consumerlevel panel data from a real world pricing experiment. The experiment allows for a decomposition of the number of wireless connections into the number of needs instances where a consumer would establish a connection if the price were zero and the conditional probability of establishing a connection. We find that needs were plenty and potential consumer surplus several magnitudes higher than that a…
Anatomy of Cartel Contracts
We study cartel contracts using data on 18 contract clauses of 109 legal Finnish manufacturing cartels. One third of the clauses relate to raising profits; the others deal with instability through incentive compatibility, cartel organization, or external threats. Cartels use three main approaches to raise profits: Price, market allocation, and specialization. These appear to be substitutes. Choosing one has implications on how cartels deal with instability. Simplifying, we find that large cartels agree on prices, cartels in homogenous goods industries allocate markets, and small cartels avoid competition through specialization.
Heritability of Lifetime Income
Using 15 years of data on Finnish twins, we find that 24% (54%) of the variance of women’s (men’s) lifetime income is due to genetic factors and that the contribution of the shared environment is negligible. We link these figures to policy by showing that controlling for education reduces the variance share of genetics by 5-8 percentage points; by demonstrating that income uncertainty has a genetic component half the size of its variance share in lifetime income; and by exploring how the genetic heritability of lifetime income is related to the macroeconomic environment, as measured by GDP growth and the Gini-coefficient of income inequality.
Cartels Uncovered
How many cartels are there? The answer is important in assessing the efficiency of competition policy. We present a Hidden Markov Model that answers the question, taking into account that often we do not know whether a cartel exists in an industry or not. Our model identifies key policy parameters from data generated under different competition policy regimes and may be used with time-series or panel data. We take the model to data from a period of legal cartels - Finnish manufacturing industries 1951 - 1990. Our estimates suggest that by the end of the period, almost all industries were cartelized.
Does Regression Discontinuity Design Work? Evidence from Random Election Outcomes
We use data for 198121 candidates and 1351 random election outcomes to estimate the effect of incumbency status on future electoral success. We find no evidence of incumbency advantage using data on randomized elections. In contrast, regression discontinuity design, using optimal bandwidths, produces a positive and significant incumbency effect. Using even narrower bandwidths aligns the results with those obtained using the randomized elections. So does the bias-correction of Calonico et al. (forthcoming). Standard validity tests are not useful in detecting the problems with the optimal bandwidths. The appropriate bandwidth seems narrower in larger elections and is thus context specific.
Public Employees as Politicians: Evidence from Close Elections
We analyze the effect of municipal employees’ political representation in municipal councils on local public spending. We use within-party, as-good-as-random variation in close elections in the Finnish open-list proportional election system to quantify the effect. One more councilor employed by the public sector increases spending by about 1%. The effect comes largely through the largest party and is specific to the employment sector of the municipal employee. The results are consistent with public employees having an information advantage over other politicians, and thus, being able to influence policy.
When does Regression discontinuity design work? Evidence from random election outcomes
We use elections data in which a large number of ties in vote counts between candidates are resolved via a lottery to study the personal incumbency advantage. We benchmark non‐experimental regression discontinuity design (RDD) estimates against the estimate produced by this experiment that takes place exactly at the cutoff. The experimental estimate suggests that there is no personal incumbency advantage. In contrast, conventional local polynomial RDD estimates suggest a moderate and statistically significant effect. Bias‐corrected RDD estimates that apply robust inference are, however, in line with the experimental estimate. Therefore, state‐of‐the‐art implementation of RDD can meet the re…
Design of Public Procurement Auctions: Evidence from Cleaning Contracts
We analyze a regime change from beauty contests to first-price sealed-bid and scoring auctions, using Swedish data on public procurement of cleaning services. In beauty contests, the lowest bid often lost, leaving substantial money on the table. The procurement costs were similar before and after the regime change: (i) Entry strongly decreases the procurement cost but did not change. Entry would have decreased had the municipalities not adjusted the objects of auctions. (ii) Municipalities favored in-house suppliers in the old regime, leading to more aggressive bidding by others. With favoritism reduced, these changes balanced each other out. Peer reviewed
The Return-to-Entrepreneurship Puzzle
The returns to entrepreneurship are monetary and non-monetary. We offer new evidence on these returns using a large sample of genetically identical male twins. Our within-twin analysis suggests that OLS estimates are downwards, and traditional first-differenced panel data estimates upwards biased. We find no differences in the earnings of men with either low or high education. Our within-twin analysis of non-monetary returns shows that entrepreneurs with low education work longer hours and have greater responsibilities, but also face a reduced risk of divorce and less monotonous work tasks. The same does not apply to highly educated entrepreneurs.
On the Returns to Invention within Firms: Evidence from Finland
International audience; In this paper we merge individual income data, firm-level data, patenting data, and IQ data in Finland over the period 1988–2012 to analyze the returns to invention for inventors and their coworkers or stakeholders within the same firm. We find that: (i) inventors collect only 8 percent of the total private return from invention; (ii) entrepreneurs get over 44 percent of the total gains; (iii) bluecollar workers get about 26 percent of the gains and the rest goes to white-collar workers. Moreover, entrepreneurs start with significant negative returns prior to the patent application, but their returns subsequently become highly positive.
Replication data for: Cartels Uncovered
How many cartels are there, and how long do they live? The answers to these questions are important in assessing the need for competition policy. We present a Hidden Markov Model that takes into account that often it is not known whether a cartel exists or not. We take the model to data from a period of legal cartels—Finnish manufacturing industries 1951–1990. Our estimates suggest that once born, cartels are persistent; by the end of the period, almost all industries were cartelized.
Replication data for: On the Returns to Invention within Firms: Evidence from Finland
In this paper we merge individual income data, firm-level data, patenting data, and IQ data in Finland over the period 1988–2012 to analyze the returns to invention for inventors and their coworkers or stakeholders within the same firm. We find that: (i) inventors collect only 8 percent of the total private return from invention; (ii) entrepreneurs get over 44 percent of the total gains; (iii) bluecollar workers get about 26 percent of the gains and the rest goes to white-collar workers. Moreover, entrepreneurs start with significant negative returns prior to the patent application, but their returns subsequently become highly positive.