0000000000141629

AUTHOR

David S. Gordon

0000-0003-0807-834x

Who Punishes? The Status of the Punishers Affects the Perceived Success of, and Indirect Benefits From, “Moralistic” Punishment

“Moralistic” punishment of free riders can provide a beneficial reputation, but the immediate behavior is costly to the punisher. In Study 1, we investigated whether variation in status would be perceived to offset or mitigate the costs of punishment. One hundred and nineteen participants were presented with a vignette describing a punishment scenario. Participants predicted whether punishment would occur, how successful it would be, and indicated their attitude to the punisher. Participants believed only intervention by a high-status (HS) individual would be successful and that low-status (LS) individuals would not intervene at all. HS individuals predicted to punish successfully were seen…

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High cooperation and welfare despite — and because of — the threat of antisocial punishments and feuds

Cooperation can be difficult to sustain when there is a temptation to free-ride on the efforts of others. In experiments, peer punishment often stabilizes cooperation but fails to improve earnings because of the costs associated with punishment. In addition, antisocial use of punishment—punishing cooperators, counterpunishing, and feuding—often leads to lower cooperation and earnings. The current study investigated if powerful individuals—individuals who can punish without cost or who are immune from punishment—police the antisocial use of punishment, thus reducing the undesirable effects of punishment. In order to create ample opportunities for antisocial punishment and identify the motive…

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