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D'acunto S.
Il doppio mito: sulla (pretesa) neutralità della politica monetaria della BCE e la (pretesa) non-vincolatività degli indirizzi di politica economica dell’Unione
Policies adopted by the governance of the EMU during the financial and Covid crises display a clear gap between the “form” and the “substance” of the institutional architecture of title VIII of the TFEU. It is submitted that this architecture is in sharp contrast with the European constitutional tradition. Furthermore, the traditional view is rejected, according to which the EU Commission and Council, as well as the ECB, are devoid of binding powers in the field of economic policy. Some reflections concerning both methodological implications of the foregoing and its possible effects on the European integration process are finally developed
Il governo tecnocratico della moneta e i crocevia del processo di integrazione europea. Riflessioni alla luce della sentenza Weiss
The well known judgment of the German Constitutional Court in the “Weiss” case has been widely criticized under EU law, mainly because of its being in contrast with a preliminary ruling rendered by the European Court of Justice in 2018. At variance with these criticisms, it is here submitted that such a judgment brings well into focus some institutional ambiguities of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU); namely, the powers (more and more) exercised by the European Central Bank (ECB) in the field of macroeconomic regulation and control, in spite of (its) not being provided with political legitimacy. Seen in this perspective, the “Karlsruhe” judgment objectively looks as aimed at restoring …