Frictional and Non-Frictional Unemployment in a Labor Market with Matching Frictions
Using the Mortensen and Pissarides model of a labor market with frictions, this paper proposes a new method, simpler than the one presented in Michaillat (2012), for decomposing unemployment into frictional and non-frictional (rationing) unemployment for a derived rigid wage-setting rule. We use it to compute the frictional and non frictional unemployment rate for two economies characterized by different labor market institutions, namely the US and the Spanish economy. For the entire period under study, the US frictional unemployment rate is around 36 per cent of total unemployment, whereas for Spain, approximately 20 per cent of all unemployment is due to frictions. This outcome may be exp…
Frictional and non-frictional unemployment in a labor market with matching frictions.
Abstract Using the Mortensen and Pissarides model of a labor market with frictions, this paper proposes a new method, simpler than the one presented in Michaillat (2012), for decomposing unemployment into frictional and non-frictional (rationing) unemployment for a derived rigid wage-setting rule. We use it to compute the frictional and non frictional unemployment rate for two economies characterized by different labor market institutions, namely the US and the Spanish economy. For the entire period under study, the US frictional unemployment rate is around 36 per cent of total unemployment, whereas for Spain, approximately 20 per cent of all unemployment is due to frictions. This outcome m…
Monopolistic competition and different wage setting systems
In this paper, we present a disequilibrium unemployment model without labor market frictions and monopolistic competition in the goods market within an infinite horizon model of growth. We consider different wage setting systems and compare wages, the unemployment rate, and income per capita in the long-run at firm, sector, and national (centralized) levels. The aim of this paper is to determine under which conditions, the inverted-U hypothesis between unemployment and the degree of centralization of wage bargaining, reported by Calmfors and Driffill [Economic Policy, 6, 14¿61, 1988], is confirmed. Our analysis shows that a high degree of market power normally produces the inverted-U shape …
When is there more employment, with individual or collective wage bargaining?
Abstract In a standard Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides labour market with frictions, the authors seek to determine when there is more employment with individual wage bargaining than with collective wage bargaining, using a wage equation generated by the standard total surplus sharing rule. Using a Cobb-Douglas production function, they find that if the bargaining power of the individual is high compared to the bargaining power of the union, there is more unemployment with individual wage setting and vice versa. When the individual worker and the union have the same bargaining power, if the cost of opening a vacancy is sufficiently high, there is more unemployment with individual wage setting. …