0000000000470628
AUTHOR
Fernando Genis Mendoza
showing 2 related works from this author
Online Pricing via Stackelberg and Incentive Games in a Micro-Grid
2019
This paper deals with the analysis and design of online pricing mechanisms in micro-grids. Two cases are studied in which the market layer is modeled as an open-loop and closed-loop dynamical system respectively. In the case of open-loop market dynamics, the price is generated as equilibrium price of a Stackelberg game with an incentive strategy. In such Stackelberg game, the leader is the energy supplier, the follower is the consumer, and the leader plays an incentive strategy. In the case of closed-loop market dynamics, the price is obtained as a function of the power supplied and the demand. A stability analysis is provided for both cases, which sheds light on the transient and steady-st…
Online pricing for demand-side management in a low-voltage resistive micro-grid via a Stackelberg game with incentive strategies
2022
It has been demonstrated that online pricing mechanisms are a viable solution for demand side management in power systems. This study deals with the analysis and design of a droop-controlled low-voltage resistive AC micro-grid network system. Such a system is subjected to a dynamic demand obtained from an online pricing mechanism, which is proposed as a novelty in the study of micro-grids. This mechanism is derived from a variation of the Stackelberg game, which includes the use of incentive strategies. First, a configuration in which a supplier announces an incentive function and (Formula presented.) -consumers’ reaction to the resulting personalised price is presented. Then, a detailed st…