Grounding the self in action
Consciousness and cognition are phenomena that seem to be inextricably bound to an individual first-person perspective: at least in standard situations, there is not only conscious experience, but also an experiencing self. And there is not only thought as such, but a thinking self as well. Why is there not only the flow of experience, but also someone—someone who has these experiences? And why do most thoughts not just occur in a free-floating way, like clouds in the sky, but seem to originate from—and within—a thinking self, a self somehow mentally portrayed as an independent cause in itself, a cognitive agent? Presently, in a number of different disciplines, two general answers seem to s…
Avoiding accidents at the champagne reception: A study of joint lifting and balancing
Using a lifting and balancing task, we contrasted two alternative views of planning joint actions: one postulating that joint action involves distinct predictions for self and other, the other postulating that joint action involves coordinated plans between the coactors and reuse of bimanual models. We compared compensatory movements required to keep a tray balanced when 2 participants lifted glasses from each other’s trays at the same time (simultaneous joint action) and when they took turns lifting (sequential joint action). Compared with sequential joint action, simultaneous joint action made it easier to keep the tray balanced. Thus, in keeping with the view that bimanual models are reu…