0000000000594294
AUTHOR
Beatriz García Osma
Gender Discrimination and the Monitoring Role of Female Directors Over Accounting Quality
Recent research in accounting suggests female directors exert more stringent monitoring over the financial reporting process than their male counterparts. However, an emerging literature in finance and economics questions whether females in leadership roles significantly differ from their male counterparts. Building on this literature, we re-examine the link between the presence of female directors, gender biases, and financial statements quality. Using a large sample of UK firms we find that a larger percentage of women among independent directors is significantly associated with lower earnings management practices. However, we show that this relation disappears if we focus on firms that d…
Prudential supervisors' independence and income smoothing in European banks
[EN] We investigate the role of prudential supervisors' independence in affecting income smoothing behavior in European banks. Powerful national supervisors are predicted to influence the accounting practices of their supervised entities, shaping the properties of the accounting numbers they prepare. In particular, we study whether greater independence of powerful supervisors from the government and from the industry is associated with lower income smoothing. We use the mandatory adoption of a single set of accounting standards in Europe as a shock to the influence of prudential supervisors over national banks' accounting practice. Our results confirm that political and industry independenc…
Prudential Supervisorss Independence and Income Smoothing in European Banks
We investigate the role of prudential supervisors’ independence in affecting income smoothing behavior in European banks. Powerful national supervisors are predicted to influence the accounting practices of their supervised entities, shaping the properties of the accounting numbers they prepare. In particular, we study whether greater independence of powerful supervisors from the government and from the industry is associated with lower income smoothing. We use the mandatory adoption of a single set of accounting standards in Europe as a shock to the influence of prudential supervisors over national banks’ accounting practice. Our results confirm that political and industry independence of …
The monitoring role of female directors over accounting quality
Recent research in accounting suggests female directors exert more stringent monitoring over the financial reporting process than their male counterparts. However, an emerging literature in finance and economics provides mixed findings and questions whether females in leadership roles significantly differ from their male counterparts. Building on this literature, we re-examine the link between the presence of female directors, gender biases, and financial statements quality. Using a large sample of UK firms we find that a larger percentage of women among independent directors is significantly associated with lower earnings management practices. However, we show that this relation disappears…
Strategic Accounting Choice Around Firm-Level Labor Negotiations
Prior literature argues that managers make opportunistic income-decreasing accounting choices to limit the concessions made to trade unions. However, empirical research to date presents mixed evidence, potentially due to a common theoretical approach that views labor bargaining as a one-shot game in nature. Using a sample of U.S. firms that engage in firm-level labor collective agreement negotiations, we study whether managers act strategically to reduce the transfer of wealth to employees, and its consequences over investment efficiency. We expect that the repeated nature of this negotiation leads to cooperation among the parties and limits the incentives for earnings manipulation, partic…