0000000000606468
AUTHOR
Esther Gutiérrez
Scoring rules: A cooperative game-theoretic approach
In this work we define the game of the alternatives for each preference profile, and establish relations between scoring rules and cooperative solution concepts for that game, such as the family of semivalues and the family of least square values.
Solidarity in games with a coalition structure
Abstract A new axiomatic characterization of the two-step Shapley value Kamijo (2009) is presented based on a solidarity principle of the members of any union: when the game changes due to the addition or deletion of players outside the union, all members of the union will share the same gains/losses.
The multichoice consistent value
We consider multichoice NTU games, i.e., cooperative NTU games in which players can participate in the game with several levels of activity. For these games, we define and characterize axiomatically the multichoice consistent value, which is a generalization of the consistent NTU value for NTU games and of the multichoice value for multichoice TU games. Moreover, we show that this value coincides with the consistent NTU value of a replicated NTU game and we provide a probabilistic interpretation.
THE SHAPLEY-SOLIDARITY VALUE FOR GAMES WITH A COALITION STRUCTURE
A value for games with a coalition structure is introduced, where the rules guiding cooperation among the members of the same coalition are different from the interaction rules among coalitions. In particular, players inside a coalition exhibit a greater degree of solidarity than they are willing to use with players outside their coalition. The Shapley value is therefore used to compute the aggregate payoffs for the coalitions, and the solidarity value to obtain the payoffs for the players inside each coalition.