showing 5 related works from this author
Bio-inspired evolutionary dynamics on complex networks under uncertain cross-inhibitory signals
2019
Given a large population of agents, each agent has three possiblechoices between option 1 or 2 or no option. The two options are equally favorable and the population has to reach consensus on one of the two options quickly and in a distributed way. The more popular an option is, the more likely it is to be chosen by uncommitted agents. Agents committed to one option can be attracted by those committed to the other option through a cross-inhibitory signal. This model originates in the context of honeybee swarms, and we generalize it to duopolistic competition and opinion dynamics. The contributions of this work include (i) the formulation of a model to explain the behavioral traits of the ho…
The Role of Asymptomatic Individuals in the COVID-19 Pandemic <i>via</i> Complex Networks
2020
Background: Recent seroprevalence studies have tried to estimate the real number of asymptomatic cases affected by COVID-19. It is of paramount importance to understand the impact of these infections in order to prevent a second wave. This study aims to model the interactions in the population by means of a complex network and to shed some light on the effectiveness of localised control measures in Italy in relation to the school opening in mid-September.} Methods: The formulation of an epidemiological predictive model is given: the advantage of using this model lies in that it discriminates between asymptomatic and symptomatic cases of COVID-19 as the interactions with these two categorie…
Opinion dynamics and stubbornness through mean-field games
2013
This paper provides a mean field game theoretic interpretation of opinion dynamics and stubbornness. The model describes a crowd-seeking homogeneous population of agents, under the influence of one stubborn agent. The game takes on the form of two partial differential equations, the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation and the Kolmogorov-Fokker-Planck equation for the individual optimal response and the population evolution, respectively. For the game of interest, we establish a mean field equilibrium where all agents reach epsilon-consensus in a neighborhood of the stubborn agent's opinion.
Evolutionary Game Dynamics for Collective Decision Making in Structured and Unstructured Environments
2017
Abstract For a large population of players we consider a collective decision making process with three possible choices: option A or B or no option. The more popular option is more likely to be chosen by uncommitted players and cross-inhibitory signals can be sent to attract players committed to a different option. This model originates in the context of honeybees swarms, and we generalise it to accommodate other applications such as duopolistic competition and opinion dynamics. The first contribution is an evolutionary game model and a corresponding new game dynamics called expected gain pairwise comparison dynamics explaining how the strategic behaviour of the players may lead to deadlock…
Stationary and Initial-Terminal Value Problem for Collective Decision Making via Mean-Field Games
2017
Given a large number of homogeneous players that are distributed across three possible states, we consider the problem in which these players have to control their transition rates, following some optimality criteria. The optimal transition rates are based on the players' knowledge of their current state and of the distribution of all the other players, thus introducing mean-field terms in the running and the terminal cost. The first contribution is a mean-field model that takes into account the macroscopic and the microscopic dynamics. The second contribution is the study of the mean-field equilibrium resulting from solving the initial-terminal value problem, involving the Kolmogorov equat…