0000000000718933
AUTHOR
Alfredo Jiménez
Political discretion and corruption: the impact of institutional quality on formal and informal entrepreneurship
This paper analyses the impact of political discretion and corruption on firm creation rates, distinguishing between formal and informal entrepreneurship. The results show that political discretion discourages the creation of formal enterprises as fewer restrictions on the government's opportunistic behaviour increases uncertainty and risks for entrepreneurial activities. Corruption also has a negative influence on formal entrepreneurship, as it increases the costs of the procedures required to create and manage the company with no assurance that the other party will fulfil the agreement. Regarding informal entrepreneurship, our results show that the negative impact of corruption also appli…
Corruption, political discretion and entrepreneurship
Purpose While common sense suggests that corruption will likely have a negative impact on the economy as it raises the cost of doing business, research on the topic showed inconsistent results (positive, negative and neutral). This paper aims to verify whether corruption has a “grease” or “sand” effect on the wheels of entrepreneurial rates and under which conditions corruption will have stronger or weaker effects. Design/methodology/approach Using institutional theory as the basis for the hypotheses, generalized least squares estimation is conducted to empirically examine the role of corruption and political discretion in entrepreneurship in a sample of 93 countries. Findings Countries wi…
The Institutionalization of Political Risk Assessment by Chinese Multinational Firms
Some researchers have claimed that Chinese firms are impervious to political risk, calling into question the institutionalization of political risk by Chinese firms. Building on resource dependence theory and the literature on non-market strategies, this study finds significant impact by ownership structure, firm scale, and the degree of internationalization on the institutionalization of political risk assessments (IPRA) by Chinese firms. As such, state-owned firms and larger firms cultivate a higher level of IPRA. We find a positive impact of a firm’s scale and scope of internationalization, but insignificant impact of depth of internationalization.