0000000000727985
AUTHOR
Giuseppe Lo Presti
Sindrome da leuconecefalopatia posteriore reversibile (RPLS): aspetti neuroradiologici
A Network Formation Game Approach to Study BitTorrent Tit-for-Tat
The Tit-for-Tat strategy implemented in BitTorrent (BT) clients is generally considered robust to selfish behaviours. The authors of [1] support this belief studying how Tit-for-Tat can affect selfish peers who are able to set their upload bandwidth. They show that there is a "good" Nash Equilibrium at which each peer uploads at the maximum rate. In this paper we consider a different game where BT clients can change the number of connections to open in order to improve their performance. We study this game using the analytical framework of network formation games [2]. In particular we characterize the set of pairwise stable networks the peers can form and how the peers can dynamically reach…