Naturalizzazione, mente e conoscenza

2009

Naturalizzazione, mente e conoscenza - A controversial issue regarding Quine’s naturalised epistemology is that it may involve some form of reductionism. This article focuses on one of these forms, analysing the interplay of his philosophy of mind and epistemology. It aims to show that if we take into proper consideration the way in which the version of anomalous monism embraced affects his conception of mental states like sensations and propositional attitudes, Quine’s philosophy of mind should be regarded as anti-reductionist. Through a discussion of his theory of perception, I try to argue that what is entailed by it is, in a sense only partially accepted by Quine himself, that neither p…

Quine and the Contemporary Debate on Mindreading

2012

Abstract The paper examines some of the questions emerging from the debate on mindreading regarding Quine’s legacy and contribution to a new agenda on the issue. Since mindreading is an exercise in folk-psychology, a) which role folk psychology has to play according to Quine? b) was Quine’s account of mindreading closer to theory-theory, simulation theory or hybrid theory? c) was Quine a rationality theorist? d) are hybrid-theory and rationality theory incompatible as many would suggest? On the score of the answers to these questions, the paper tries to suggest a Quinean inspired blend of rationality-based and hybrid view-based strategies to explain mindreading.

Pragmatismo, a priori, analiticità: la linea genealogica Peirce-Lewis-Quine

2006

Intenzionalità collettiva, ontologia sociale e mindreading

2014

In his Collective Intentions and Actions John Searle argued that having a preintentional sense of others as at least potentially cooperative agents “like me” is a necessary condition of collective intentionality. He also argued, in Rationality in Action, that understanding others qua intentional agents necessarily presupposes rationality because rational constraints are built into the logical structure of intentional phenomena. In this paper we will try to specify further these claims in the light of current debate on mindreading, where other-understanding is spelled out either in terms of automatic, subpersonal simulative mechanisms, or in terms of normative, rational principles. We will a…

Naturalismo e razionalità

2008

Razionalità e simulazione nella comprensione sociale

2012

Conoscenza e percezione: epistemologie cognitiviste e naturalizzazione del relativismo

2010

What Pragmatist Genealogy for Quine?

2005

Epistemologia e normatività in W.V. Quine

2003

Introduzione a Mente e Corpo: Aspetti filosofici e scientifici

2005

Mente, linguaggio e razionalità. Il naturalismo di W.V. Quine ed il dibattito contemporaneo.

2013

Una lettura non riduzionista della filosofia della mente di W. V Quine, offre la chiave per apprezzare alcune fondamentali curvature teoriche del suo naturalismo epistemologico. Permette di evidenziare una concezione dell'osservazione quale cognitivamente permeata che non implichi forme radicali di relativismo conoscitivo e di rendere perspicua la rilevanza delle aperture sul tema dell'empatia nella comprensione dell'altro. Ne emerge, in dialogo con voci autorevoli del dibattito contemporaneo, un'interpretazione che si discosta da alcuni stereotipi storiografici consolidati e tratteggia i contorni di una peculiare concezione naturalistica della razionalità.

Pensiero, percezione e linguaggio in W.V. Quine

2012

Notwithstanding his well known behaviorism, Quine connects language learning to the ability of understanding others by means of empathy, namely perceiving what an other is perceiving. The paper discusses and resolves the prima facie oddity between this thesis and Quine's criticism of propositional attitudes. It analyzes the notion of empathy and the cognitive mechanism underlying it. It explains also the role of empathy and of mindreading abilities in language learning and understanding others. Comparing Quine's account of mindreading to the main options in the current debate on the topic, it assess the validity of the Quinean inspired blend of rationality-based and hybrid view-based strate…

Naturalismo ed empirismo nella filosofia di W.V. Quine

2004

Social
 Ontology,
Collective 
Intentionality,
and
Mindreading

2013

Standard 
accounts 
of 
social 
reality 
take
collective
 intentionality 
as 
the starting 
point
 of
 the
 creation
 and
 maintenance
 of
 social
 facts.
 But 
collective intentionality 
is 
enabled, 
as
Searle
 suggests,
by
 a 
more 
basic
 capacity 
to 
understand 
another 
person
 as 
an 
agent
like 
oneself
 and
 as 
ready 
to 
engage 
in 
cooperative 
activities.
 We 
can 
coordinate 
our 
collective 
actions
 only
 insofar
 we
 are
 able
 to
 explain
 and
 predict
 the
 behavior
 of
 other
 persons,
 we
 can
 understand 
behavior 
only 
insofar
 we 
can
mindread
 them,
and 
we 
can 
mindread 
them
only
 if
 we
 assume
 the
 constitutive
 role
 of
 rationality
 in
 action.
 Therefore
…

La mente in pubblico:prospettive esterniste in filosofia della mente

2005

Le radici del naturalismo. W.V. Quine tra eredità empirista e pragmatismo

2007