0000000000850900
AUTHOR
Alex Barrachina
Entry and espionage with noisy signals
Abstract We analyze the effect of industrial espionage on entry deterrence. We consider a monopoly incumbent who may expand capacity to deter entry, and a potential entrant who owns an Intelligence System. The Intelligence System (IS) generates a noisy signal based on the incumbentʼs actions. The potential entrant uses this signal to decide whether or not to enter the market. The incumbent may signal-jam to manipulate the likelihood of the noisy signals and hence affect the entrantʼs decisions. If the precision of the IS is commonly known, the incumbent benefits from his rivalʼs espionage. Actually, he benefits more the higher is the precision of the IS while the spying entrant is worse off…
Multiplicity in financial equilibrium with portfolio constrains under the generalized logarithmic utility model
Previous research on the effects of constraints to take unbounded positions in risky financial assets shows that, under the logarithmic utility function, multiplicity of equilibrium may emerge. This paper shows that this result is robust to either constant, decreasing or increasing relative risk aversion obtained under the generalized logarithmic utility function.
Market Must Be Defended: The Role of Counter-Espionage Policy in Maximizing Domestic Market Welfare
Countering economic espionage is becoming one of the priorities of the governments of advanced economies. The present paper takes a step forward in the theoretical analysis of the interaction between economic espionage and counter-espionage by focusing on the case of a market opened to international trade. This analysis represents a first approximation to an inquiry into the rationale for the influence of the market level of competition on the dynamics of such interaction. The results suggest that this influence is complex in the case of the effort exerted in economic espionage and the characteristics of market demand play an important role in it. In the case of the counter-espionage policy…
Entry with two correlated signals : the case of industrial espionage and its positive competitive effects
Recent advances in information and communication technologies have increased the incentives for firms to acquire information about rivals. These advances may have major implications for market entry because they make it easier for potential entrants to gather valuable information about, for example, an incumbent’s cost structure. However, little theoretical research has actually analyzed this question. This paper advances the literature by extending a one-sided asymmetric information version of Milgrom and Roberts’ (1982) limit pricing model. Here, the entrant is allowed access to an intelligence system (IS) of a certain precision that generates a noisy signal on the incumbent’s cost struct…