0000000000926800

AUTHOR

Claudio Giachetti

0000-0002-4609-9750

Behind the curtain of international diversification: An agency theory perspective

This paper dissects the antecedents of international diversification through the lens of the agency cost of free cash flow arguments. It explores whether the partial convergence of interests among managers, majority shareholders, and minority shareholders affects a firm's choice to diversify internationally. Using a sample panel of 60 Italian firms evaluated longitudinally from 2004 to 2014, the study tests whether a firm's international diversification is affected by its free cash flow (as the ultimate source of managerial discretion) and debt (as the main constraint to managerial discretion), especially in firm contexts that exacerbate agency problems. We find that the effects on internat…

research product

Unveiling the Antecedents of International Diversification: An Agency Theory Approach

While various studies have developed hypotheses about the antecedents of international diversification drawing mainly on the resource-based view, the behavioral theory of the firm, and the transaction costs literature, we advance our understanding by investigating the explanatory power of agency costs of free cash flow arguments. Using a sample panel of 167 Italian firms longitudinally evaluated during the 1980-2010 period, this study tests whether the firm’s choice to spread operations in multiple foreign countries is conditioned by excess of free cash flow and debt, especially in firm-contexts where agency problems are exacerbated by managers or large shareholders’ opportunism. We find th…

research product

Unveiling the Antecedents of International Diversification: An Agency Theory Approach

While various studies have developed hypotheses about the antecedents of international diversification drawing mainly on the resource-based view, the behavioral theory of the firm, and the transaction costs literature, we advance our understanding by investigating the explanatory power of agency costs of free cash flow arguments. Using a sample panel of 167 Italian firms longitudinally evaluated during the 1980-2010 period, this study tests whether the firm’s choice to spread operations in multiple foreign countries is conditioned by excess of free cash flow and debt, especially in firm-contexts where agency problems are exacerbated by managers or large shareholders’ opportunism. We find th…

research product