0000000000956219

AUTHOR

Sjur Didrik Flåm

showing 2 related works from this author

Prices and Pareto optima

2006

We provide necessary conditions for Pareto optimum in economies where tastes or technologies may be nonconvex, nonsmooth, and affected by externalities. Firms can pursue own objectives, much like the consumers. Infinite-dimensional commodity spaces are accommodated. Public goods and material balances are accounted for as special instances of linear restrictions.

Microeconomicsjel:C60first and second welfare theorem; weak and strong Pareto optimum; nonconvex tastes or technologies; public goods; externalities; local separation; subdifferentials; normal conesControl and OptimizationApplied Mathematicsjel:D60jel:D50EconomicsPareto principleManagement Science and Operations ResearchPublic goodCommodity (Marxism)ExternalityOptimization
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Strategic behavior and partial cost sharing

2003

Abstract The main objects here are games in which players mainly compete but nonetheless collaborate on some subsidiary activities. Play assumes a two-stage nature in that first-stage moves presume coordination of some subsequent tasks. Specifically, we consider instances where second-stage coordination amounts to partial cost sharing, anticipated and sustained as a core solution. Examples include regional Cournot oligopolies with joint transportation. We define and characterize equilibria, and inquire about their existence.

MicroeconomicsOligopolyEconomics and EconometricsCore (game theory)symbols.namesakeNash equilibriumStrategic behaviorEconomicssymbolsCost sharingCournot competitionFinanceGames and Economic Behavior
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