6533b855fe1ef96bd12b07b9
RESEARCH PRODUCT
Strategic behavior and partial cost sharing
Sjur Didrik FlåmSjur Didrik FlåmAbderrahim Jouranisubject
MicroeconomicsOligopolyEconomics and EconometricsCore (game theory)symbols.namesakeNash equilibriumStrategic behaviorEconomicssymbolsCost sharingCournot competitionFinancedescription
Abstract The main objects here are games in which players mainly compete but nonetheless collaborate on some subsidiary activities. Play assumes a two-stage nature in that first-stage moves presume coordination of some subsequent tasks. Specifically, we consider instances where second-stage coordination amounts to partial cost sharing, anticipated and sustained as a core solution. Examples include regional Cournot oligopolies with joint transportation. We define and characterize equilibria, and inquire about their existence.
| year | journal | country | edition | language |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2003-04-01 | Games and Economic Behavior |