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AUTHOR
Josep L. Prades
Physicalism and the mental: the dominant view
The main purpose of this book is to elaborate a number of reductio arguments that are meant to challenge causal physicalism, as well as the dominant view, in its attempt to show the compatibility between the causal efficacy of the mental and causal physicalism. As a result, we will provide an alternative analysis of our intuitions about the primacy of the physical that fits with the casual autonomy of mental properties. The present chapter is meant to characterize and motivate the dominant view.
El conexionismo y su impacto en la filosofía de la mente
Discusión del impacto del surgimiento del conexionismo en la filosofía de la mente
Moral Emotions, Principles, and the Locus of Moral Perception
I vindicate the thrust of the particularist position in moral deliberation. to this purpose, I focus on some elements that seem to play a crucial role in first-person moral deliberation and argue that they cannot be incorporated into a more sophisticated system of moral principles. More specifically, I emphasize some peculiarities of moral perception in the light of which I defend the irreducible deliberative relevance of a certain phenomenon, namely: the phenomenon of an agent morally coming across a particular situation. Following on from Bernard Williams, I talk of an agent's character as a factor that con- tributes to fixing what situations an agent comes morally across. A crucial point…
Minds, causes, and mechanisms [Introducció]
This book questions the internal consistency of causal physicalism, and vindicates a novel approach to mental causation. Throught a series of original and detailed arguments, it is made clear that many difficulties in the physicalist picture derive from an implausible view about causality. An alternative approach is defended which shows how mental contents, as opposed to functional propierties, may be causally efficacious without having an implementing mechanism.
Incompatibilismo y necesidad contrafáctica
Algunos piensan que este conflicto entre la imagen determinista del mundo y la libertad de decisión es irresoluble, y ello les define como incompatibilistas; mientras que otros consideran que hay modos de integrar ambas intuiciones y merecen, pues, el nombre de compatibilistas. El presente artículo pretende mediar en el debate entre estas dos posiciones. Para ello, reflexionaremos acerca de la naturaleza de los vínculos contrafácticos implicados en las relaciones causales que se presuponen tanto en la imagen determinista del mundo como en nuestras intuiciones acerca de la libertad de decisión. En concreto, nuestra propuesta vendrá a subrayar la debilidad de las estrategias compatibili…