0000000001105541
AUTHOR
Georg Tillmann
Evasion of Tax on Interest Income in a Two-Country Model
t We consider a model where agents can invest money at home and abroad. Their total income comprises interest income from these investments and labor income. Tax on interest income can be evaded — at the risk of being detected and fined. We analyze the optimal portfolio and tax evading decisions of agents with different incomes. In a second step, we scrutinize the optimal government policy. Using different instruments government tries to maximize total tax receipts and to prevent flight of capital as far as possible.
Income Equality and Income Taxation
In every society the distribution of income plays an essential role — not only for economists but also for social scientists and politicians. Most people agree that the laissez-faire allo-cation is not equitable but that some redistribution using taxes has to take place. Most of the literature has supposed that a Bergson- Samuelson social welfare function is the appropriate tool for capturing social values in such analyses. However, there are some objections against this approach. First, interpersonal comparability of the individual utilities is needed — an extremely strong and questionable claim. Second, most writers have worked with a concave transformation of individual cardinal utilitie…