La autonomía moral en el yusnaturalismo tomasiano

Aquinas seems to hold following theses on moral autonomy. (1) «Nobody imposes his acts the law»: there is no perfect, no radical autonomy (even in Kant). (2) Natural law is defined as participation in the eternal law. That means «theonomy» which for Kluxen is not primordial, but adventitious metaphysical interpretation. (3) We could speak of «cognitive autonomy»: human reason is competent to formulate norms and moral judgements. (4) But the cognitive acts are accompanied by voluntary consent: which is natural and necessary in first principles; becomes worlds consens in the natural law conclusions (see the general opinion of Spanish Scholastics); and becomes correct desire in prudence and, e…

Caridad y autonomía, versus coacción y heteronomía. Una nueva manera de entender el cristianismo como antídoto del pensamiento único.

La filosofía de la coacción en el medievo

Christian philosophical tradition, medieval in a large sense, recieves from greek philosophy a positive valuation of coaction as auxiliary instrument of morality. Saint Augustine reinforces it by his reference to "libido" and to original sin. Saint Thomas consideres "providential" the whole punitive dimension of state. Marsilius of Padova converts coaction into the essence of law. Suarez concieves law as (non democratical) "imposition" of superior's will. The two authors seem defenseless against the modern phenomenon of "power centralization".

Articulaciones conceptuales de los derechos humanos