0000000001248249
AUTHOR
Amparo Urbano Salvador
Delegated agency in multiproduct oligopolies with indivisible goods
This paper focuses on oligopolistic markets in which indivisible goods are sold by multiproduct firms to a continuum of homogeneous buyers, with measure normalized to one, who have preferences over bundles of products. Our analysis contributes to the literature on delegated agency games with direct externalities and complete information, extending the insights by Berheim and Whinston (1986, a , b) to markets with indivisibilities. By analyzing a kind of extended contract schedules - mixed bundling prices - that discriminate on exclusivity, the paper shows that efficient equilibria always exist in such settings. There may also exist inefficient equilibria in which the agent chooses a subopti…
Wage premium in the industrial sector of the spanish economy : empirical evidence.
t. This paper presents evidence that firm-level productivity increases when the relative wage rises, or the level of unemployment rises. Both facts are consistent with the efficiency wage model. Moreover, there is support for the idea that an increase in the sector"s wage with respect to the previous year also increases productivity. We obtain the empirical evidence through a double-hurdle model. We use this estimation technique because it can be established that the differences in productivity between sectors could be explained by differences in effort. It means that some of the industrial sectors of the Spanish economy may pay wage premia while others do not. We also test this implication…