0000000001324227
AUTHOR
Aidan Keane
Trust predicts cooperation with conservation conflict interventions in a framed public-goods game
Conservation conflicts are widespread, wicked problems, with damaging environmental and social consequences. Many different types of interventions have been designed and implemented to manage conservation conflicts. However, little attention has been paid as to whether who carries out these interventions is important. In this presentation, I describe how we used a novel experimental framed public goods game to test how stakeholder support for conservation conflict interventions varies with different intervening groups. I then show how we explored whether this variance was explained by differences in trust, since trust in conservation organisations has been identified as important in shaping…
Detecting deterrence from patrol data
The threat posed to protected areas (PAs) by the illegal killing of wildlife is countered principally by ranger patrols that aim to detect and deter potential offenders. Deterring poaching is a fundamental conservation objective [1]. However, deterrence is difficult to identify, especially when the prime source of information comes in the form of the patrols’ own records, which inevitably contain biases [2]. Sophisticated statistical techniques for the analysis of patrol data have been developed which considerable promise [3], but there is also a need for simple, widely-applicable metrics which can reliably detect deterrence. Here, we present a mechanistic model of law-breaking and law enfo…