6533b7cffe1ef96bd1258265
RESEARCH PRODUCT
The Strategic Use of Innovation to Influence Environmental Policy: Taxes versus Standards
Santiago J. RubioRafael Moner-colonquessubject
Economics and EconometricsPublic economics020209 energyEmission standardmedia_common.quotation_subject05 social sciencesEconomics Econometrics and Finance (miscellaneous)Control (management)Emission taxRegulator02 engineering and technologyMicroeconomics0502 economics and business0202 electrical engineering electronic engineering information engineeringEconomicsStrategic behaviorEnvironmental policy050207 economicsMonopolyWelfaremedia_commondescription
Abstract This paper evaluates the strategic behavior of a polluting monopolist to influence environmental policy, either with taxes or with standards, comparing two alternative policy games. The first of the games assumes that the regulator commits to an ex-ante level of the policy instrument. The second one is the time-consistent policy game. We find that the strategic behavior of the firm is welfare improving and leads to more environmental innovation than under regulatory commitment if a tax is used to control pollution. However, the contrary occurs if an emission standard is used. Under commitment, it is shown that both policy instruments are equivalent. We conclude that the optimal environmental policy is to use an emission tax since it yields the same welfare level than an emission standard for a committed regulator yet a larger welfare for a non-committed regulator.
| year | journal | country | edition | language |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2015-12-05 | The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy |