6533b7d2fe1ef96bd125f5b1
RESEARCH PRODUCT
La elección del momento oportuno de la política ambiental en un mercado duopolístico
Santiago J. RubioRafael Moner-colonquessubject
Standardsbusiness.industrymedia_common.quotation_subjectImpuestosGeography Planning and DevelopmentControl (management)Clean technologyTaxesAgricultural and Biological Sciences (miscellaneous)MicroeconomicsDuopolyInnovaciónEstándaresCommitmentStrategic behaviorEnvironmental policyBusinessInnovationDuopolioWelfareGeneral Environmental Sciencemedia_commonCompromisodescription
[EN] In this paper the strategic use of innovation by two polluting firms to influence environ-mental policy is evaluated. The analysis is carried out by comparing two alternative policy regimes for two policy instruments: Taxes and standards. The first of the regimes assumes that the regulator commits to an ex-ante level of the policy instrument. In the second one, there is no commitment. The results show that when there is no commitment and a tax is used to control emissions, the strategic behavior of firms can be welfare improving if the efficiency of the clean technology is relatively low. If this is not the case, the strategic behavior of the duopolists has a detrimental effect on welfare regardless of the policy instru-ment used to control emissions
| year | journal | country | edition | language |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2015-06-26 |