6533b7d7fe1ef96bd1268217

RESEARCH PRODUCT

Prevention of occupational injuries moral hazard and complex agency relationship

Christian Trontin Sophie Bejean

subject

Relations de travailSécurité socialeModèle[SHS.SOCIO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Sociology[SHS.SOCIO] Humanities and Social Sciences/SociologyAccident du travailSociologie du travail[ SHS.SOCIO ] Humanities and Social Sciences/SociologyWorking Relations.RisqueSociologie du travail et des organisationsMoralitySocial SecurityProductivitéRelation professionnelleProfessional RelationWork accidentSociology of work and organizationSociology of workThéorieTheoryMoralitéOrganisation du travailProductivityHazard

description

This paper exploits the results of agency theory with the aim of contributing a new viewpoint and a form for analysis of the current functioning of the occupational injury and disease section of the Social Security system in its mission of providing incentives for prevention. After outlining the organization and specific features of insurance against occupational risks, an initial level of analysis highlights the presence of moral hazard in relations between insurer and company and between company and employee. A second level of analysis and resort to complex agency relationship models, multitask model and third-party model, is necessary to take into account the consequences for occupational injury prevention of wage indexing on productivity and the presence of supervisors between the legislator and the company.

yearjournalcountryeditionlanguage
2001-01-01
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01526494