6533b7d9fe1ef96bd126c04a

RESEARCH PRODUCT

Union structure and incentives for innovation

Vicente CalabuigMiguel González-maestre

subject

Structure (mathematical logic)OligopolyEconomics and EconometricsIncentiveMarket economyPolitical Science and International RelationsMarket sizeEconomicsContext (language use)Cournot competitionDuopolyIndustrial organization

description

Abstract In this paper, we consider the effect of union structure on the adoption of innovation in the context of Cournot duopoly. With a market size large enough, we show that the incentive to innovate is higher under a decentralized union structure (with each firm facing its own independent union) than under an industry-wide union. However, for a small market size (or, equivalently, for sufficiently drastic potential innovation), the new technology is more likely to be adopted in the presence of a centralized union. This result goes against the conventional view that unionization harms the incentive to innovate.

yearjournalcountryeditionlanguage
2002-03-01European Journal of Political Economy
https://doi.org/10.1016/s0176-2680(01)00074-x