6533b7d9fe1ef96bd126cc64
RESEARCH PRODUCT
Locke and Active Perception
Vili Lähteenmäkisubject
Visual perceptionScrutinyActive perceptionPerceptionmedia_common.quotation_subjectPsychologyCognitive psychologymedia_commondescription
This article examines whether Locke can consistently maintain that perception is a fully passive process. His view is put under scrutiny under two senses of activity. Does Locke reject active perception in light of his own understanding of activity; or rather, does he treat perception as passive in that the mind has only a general capacity of reception of ideas and does not contribute in specific ways to organizing specific types of perceptions? Locke’s view of perception is evaluated in these respects in three contexts: the role of noticing in perception, visual perception of shape, and reflection as a form of inner perception. It is argued that with respect to noticing and reflection Locke consistently supports his thesis that ideas are passively received, but in visual perception of shape he ascribes an active role to the mind in the sense that the mind contributes more to the perceptual process than a general and passive capacity to receive ideas can allow.
year | journal | country | edition | language |
---|---|---|---|---|
2014-01-01 |