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RESEARCH PRODUCT

Ancient Theories of Reasoning

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In this section, the central question is whether we can find ancient discussions concerning what happens in the mind when a conclusion is drawn. Did ancient authors suppose that there is a psychological force that compels us to accept the conclusion when the premises are accepted and the inference is valid? Or, if the inference is not deductively valid but adds to the credibility of the conclusion in another way, e.g., by being inductive, what happens in the mind when such an inference is drawn? In general, psychology of reasoning was not a vital topic in antiquity. Reasoning was typically considered from a logical, not from a psychological point of view. For example, in Stoic sources the necessity by which the conclusion follows from the premises is described in terms of the truth conditions of a conditional; no psychological force is postulated. However, some ancient authors made passing remarks here and there which seem to imply that we are somehow forced to draw a conclusion if the inference is valid. Whether this force is psychological or not, was not specified. In a similar vein, we can also ask what happens in the mind when we reason falsely. This was not a prominent topic either, but we find Aristotle’s passing remark that in language-based fallacies we mix the things with their symbols in language (2).