6533b7dafe1ef96bd126f675
RESEARCH PRODUCT
Consensus in opinion dynamics as a repeated game
Mark CannonDario BausoDario Bausosubject
Computer Science::Computer Science and Game Theory0209 industrial biotechnologyeducation.field_of_studyComputer scienceStochastic gamePopulation02 engineering and technologyApproachability01 natural sciences010305 fluids & plasmasTerm (time)020901 industrial engineering & automationControl and Systems EngineeringDynamics (music)0103 physical sciencesRepeated gameElectrical and Electronic EngineeringSet (psychology)educationMathematical economicsGame theorydescription
Abstract We study an n -agent averaging process with dynamics subject to controls and adversarial disturbances. The model arises in multi-population opinion dynamics with macroscopic and microscopic intertwined dynamics. The averaging process describes the influence from neighbouring populations, whereas the input term indicates how the distribution of opinions in the population changes as a result of dynamical evolutions at a microscopic level (individuals’ changing opinions). The input term is obtained as the vector payoff of a two player repeated game. We study conditions under which the agents achieve robust consensus to some predefined target set. Such conditions build upon the approachability principle in repeated games with vector payoffs.
| year | journal | country | edition | language |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2018-02-17 | Automatica |