6533b7dcfe1ef96bd1273336

RESEARCH PRODUCT

TEMPORARY CONTRACTS, EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION AND SKILL: AN APPLICATION TO SPAIN*

Elena CasquelAntoni Cunyat

subject

Economics and EconometricsLabour economicsmedia_common.quotation_subjectUnemploymentEconomicsSurvey data collectionCompeting risksProductivitymedia_common

description

In this paper we explain the different conversion patterns of temporary contracts by the impact of employment protection in combination with differences in productivity between workers. We use longitudinal survey data from individuals to estimate a competing risks model with multispells for Spain. The model includes correlated unobserved determinants in the transition rates to deal with selectivity. We find that workers with higher levels of education have a stronger probability of finding a permanent job. In contrast, low-educated workers have a stronger probability of ending in unemployment or another temporary contract. Furthermore, we show the importance of employment protection in affecting the threshold level above which workers gain access to a permanent contract.

https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9957.2011.02226.x