0000000000400660
AUTHOR
Elena Casquel
TEMPORARY CONTRACTS, EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION AND SKILL: AN APPLICATION TO SPAIN*
In this paper we explain the different conversion patterns of temporary contracts by the impact of employment protection in combination with differences in productivity between workers. We use longitudinal survey data from individuals to estimate a competing risks model with multispells for Spain. The model includes correlated unobserved determinants in the transition rates to deal with selectivity. We find that workers with higher levels of education have a stronger probability of finding a permanent job. In contrast, low-educated workers have a stronger probability of ending in unemployment or another temporary contract. Furthermore, we show the importance of employment protection in affe…
Temporary contracts, employment protection and skill: A simple model
Abstract We construct a theoretical labor market that incorporates skill differences across workers to identify under which conditions temporary contracts are a way to access to permanency. Firing costs and unemployment benefits increase the threshold productivity above which workers access to permanency.
The determinants of post-compulsory education in Spain
In this article we explain why Spain is at the bottom of the developed countries in secondary education. We have made use of extensive information contained in the ECHP supplemented with labour market data. We find that higher rates of unemployment diminish the probability of investing in post-compulsory education and this effect differs across the population. Our results suggest that a ‘poverty effect’ makes access more difficult to secondary education in Spain.