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RESEARCH PRODUCT

The Impact of CEO Long-term Equity-based Compensation Incentives on Economic Growth in Collectivist versus Individualist Countries

Trond RandøyRosita P. ChangJack C. DejongRobert DoktorLars OxelheimCynthia J. Campbell

subject

Economics and EconometricsLabour economicsLongitudinal studyComputingMilieux_THECOMPUTINGPROFESSIONCompensation (psychology)05 social sciencesCollectivismEquity (finance)GeneralLiterature_MISCELLANEOUSTerm (time)IndividualismIncentiveReal gross domestic product0502 economics and businessPolitical Science and International RelationsBusiness050207 economicsEconomic systemComputingMilieux_MISCELLANEOUS050203 business & managementFinance

description

This study examines the impact of the prevalence of long-term equity-based chief executive officer (CEO) compensation incentives on GDP growth, and we address the moderating role of individualist versus collectivist cultures on this relationship. We argue that long-term incentives given to CEOs in some firms may convey to other CEOs that they too may be able to receive such incentives and rewards if they emulate the incentivized and rewarded CEOs. In a longitudinal study across 22 nations over a 5-year period, we find that the higher proportion of CEOs in a country are awarded long-term equity-based incentive compensation, the greater future real GDP growth, particularly in collectivist countries.

yearjournalcountryeditionlanguage
2016-06-01Asian Economic Papers
https://doi.org/10.1162/asep_a_00432