6533b820fe1ef96bd127a51c
RESEARCH PRODUCT
FOREIGN MONOPOLIES AND TARIFF AGREEMENTS UNDER INTEGRATED MARKETS
Santiago J. RubioDolores Alepuzsubject
MicroeconomicsVariable (computer science)foreign monopolies self-enforcing tariff agreements integrated markets rent-shifting hypothesis prices versus quantitiesEconomicsTariffjel:D42Monopolyjel:F13description
In this paper the optimal policy and the stability of a tariff agreement among the importers of a monopolized good that is sold in an integrated market are studied. To analyze the stability, the tariff agreement formation is modelled as a two-stage game. In the first stage each importer decides whether or not to sign the agreement and in the second stage the signatories and non-signatories choose their tariff whereas the monopoly chooses the quantity or the price. The findings show that the optimal policy of the importers depends on which strategic variable is selected by the monopolist but that, on the contrary, this decision has no effects on the level of cooperation that can be reached by a self-enforcing tariff agreement that, in any case, is very low.
| year | journal | country | edition | language |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2005-12-01 |