Search results for "jel:D42"
showing 4 items of 4 documents
Conflict, Evolution, Hegemony, and the Power of the State
2013
In a model of evolution driven by conflict between societies more powerful states have an advantage. When the influence of outsiders is small we show that this results in a tendency to hegemony. In a simple example in which institutions differ in their “exclusiveness” we find that these hegemonies will be inefficiently “extractive” in the sense of having inefficiently high taxes, high compensation for state officials, and low welfare.
FOREIGN MONOPOLIES AND TARIFF AGREEMENTS UNDER INTEGRATED MARKETS
2005
In this paper the optimal policy and the stability of a tariff agreement among the importers of a monopolized good that is sold in an integrated market are studied. To analyze the stability, the tariff agreement formation is modelled as a two-stage game. In the first stage each importer decides whether or not to sign the agreement and in the second stage the signatories and non-signatories choose their tariff whereas the monopoly chooses the quantity or the price. The findings show that the optimal policy of the importers depends on which strategic variable is selected by the monopolist but that, on the contrary, this decision has no effects on the level of cooperation that can be reached b…
On Capturing Oil Rents with a National Excise Tax Revisited
2004
In this paper the scope of Bergstrom’s (1982) results is studied. Moreover, his analysis is extended assuming that extraction cost is directly related to accumulated extractions. For the case of a competitive market it is found that the optimal policy is a constant tariff if extraction is costless. However, with depletion effects, the optimal tariff must ultimately be decreasing. For the case of a monopolistic market the results depend crucially on the kind of strategies the importing country governments can play and on whether the monopolist chooses the price or extraction rate. For a price-setting monopolist it is shown that the importing countries cannot use a tariff to capture monopoly …
Adam Smith on Monopoly Theory. Making good a lacuna
2014
This article analyses Adam Smith's views on monopoly by focusing on Book IV and V of The Wealth of Nations. It argues that the majority of scholars have assessed Smith's analysis of monopoly starting from premises different from those, actually though implicitly, used by Smith. We show that Smith makes use of the word 'monopoly' to refer to a heterogeneous collection of market outcomes, besides that of a single seller market, and that Smith's account of monopolists' behaviour is richer than that provided by later theorists. We also show that Smith was aware of the growth-retarding effect of monopoly and urged State regulation. © 2014 Scottish Economic Society.