6533b821fe1ef96bd127be8c
RESEARCH PRODUCT
¿Es posible ser moralmente responsable? Notas para una nueva definición del concepto de sujeto
Vicente Raga Rosalenysubject
DeterminismFilosofía de la acción; Responsabilidad moral; Agente; Compatibilismo; Incompatibilismo; Determinismo; Libre albedrío; Identidad socialIdentidad sociallcsh:AMoral ResponsibilityIncompatibilismResponsabilidad moralGeneral WorksAgentCompatibilismoFilosofía de la acciónSocial IdentityUNESCO::FILOSOFÍA:FILOSOFÍA [UNESCO]AgenteACompatibilismFree WillIncompatibilismoDeterminismoLibre albedríolcsh:General WorksPhilosophy of Actiondescription
The Strawson´s Basic Argument is the stronger against moral responsibility in Philosophy of action. One should be responsible of his identity to be moral responsible of his actions, but then nobody could be never responsible. In this article I criticize orthodox solutions to Strawson´s sceptical challenge and show how they share with the Argument the same theological notion of monadical agent. A new solution needs a new conception of agent..
| year | journal | country | edition | language |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2006-04-01 | Arbor: Ciencia, Pensamiento y Cultura |