6533b821fe1ef96bd127c123

RESEARCH PRODUCT

The Impact of CEO Long-Term Equity-Based Compensation Incentives on Economic Growth in Collectivist Versus Individualist Countries

Cynthia J. CampbellJack De Jong Jr.Trond RandøyLars OxelheimLars OxelheimLars OxelheimRobert DoktorRosita P. Chang

subject

Longitudinal studyIndividualismLabour economicsExecutive compensationIncentiveComputingMilieux_THECOMPUTINGPROFESSIONReal gross domestic productCompensation (psychology)CollectivismEquity (finance)EconomicsComputingMilieux_MISCELLANEOUSGeneralLiterature_MISCELLANEOUS

description

This study examines the impact of the prevalence of long-term equity-based CEO compensation incentives on GDP growth, and we address the moderating role of individualist versus collectivist cultures on this relationship. We argue long-term incentives given to CEOs in some firms may convey to other CEOs that they too may be able to receive such incentives and rewards if they emulate the incentivized and rewarded CEOs. In a longitudinal study across twenty-two nations over a five-year period, we find that when a higher proportion of CEOs in a country are awarded long-term equity-based incentive compensation, the greater future real GDP growth, particularly in collectivist countries.

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2670669