6533b823fe1ef96bd127e9c5
RESEARCH PRODUCT
Cheap Talk with Two Audiences: An Experiment
Praveen KujalMarta Troya-martinezMarta Troya-martinezRoberto Hernan GonzalezRoberto Hernan GonzalezMikhail DrugovMikhail Drugovsubject
Information transmissionStrategic thinkingCheap talkExploitComputer scienceHuman–computer interactionCognitive Reflection TestWithin personCognitionTest (assessment)description
In this paper we experimentally test strategic information transmission between one informed and two uninformed agents in a cheap-talk game. We find evidence of the “disciplining” effect of public communication as compared to private; however, it is much weaker than predicted by the theory. Adding a second receiver naturally increases the complexity of strategic thinking when communication is public. Using the level-k model, we exploit the within subject design to show how individuals decrease their level-k in public communication. Surprisingly, we find that individuals become more sophisticated when they communicate privately with two receivers rather than one.
| year | journal | country | edition | language |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2017-01-01 | SSRN Electronic Journal |