6533b826fe1ef96bd12848c1

RESEARCH PRODUCT

How significant is yardstick competition among governments? Three reasons to dig deeper

Pierre Salmon

subject

JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making/D.D7.D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking Lobbying Elections Legislatures and Voting BehaviordecentralizationContext (language use)Public choiceDecentralizationCompetition (economics)JEL : H - Public Economics/H.H7 - State and Local Government • Intergovernmental Relations/H.H7.H77 - Intergovernmental Relations • Federalism • SecessionGovernmentsYardstickJEL : H - Public Economics/H.H1 - Structure and Scope of Government/H.H1.H11 - Structure Scope and Performance of Governmentfederalism0502 economics and business050602 political science & public administrationEconomics[ SHS.ECO ] Humanities and Social Sciences/Economies and finances050207 economicspolitical yardstick competition[SHS.ECO] Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and FinanceJEL : H - Public Economics/H.H7 - State and Local Government • Intergovernmental Relations/H.H7.H70 - GeneralComputingMilieux_MISCELLANEOUSPublic economicsJEL: H - Public Economics/H.H7 - State and Local Government • Intergovernmental Relations/H.H7.H77 - Intergovernmental Relations • Federalism • Secession05 social sciencesJEL: H - Public Economics/H.H7 - State and Local Government • Intergovernmental Relations/H.H7.H70 - General16. Peace & justice[SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Financepolitical yardstick competitionfederalismdecentralizationsystemsJEL: H - Public Economics/H.H1 - Structure and Scope of Government/H.H1.H11 - Structure Scope and Performance of Government0506 political scienceYardstick competitionsystemsFiscal federalismFederalismJEL : D - Microeconomics/D.D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making/D.D7.D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking Lobbying Elections Legislatures and Voting BehaviorEconomics and Finance Politics and Public PolicyPublic finance

description

22 pages; The significance of yardstick competition among governments is now confirmed with regard to fiscal variables. This is an important result but the significance of the mechanism must also be sought in a context broader than that of fiscal federalism and without limitation to relations and processes fully observable. Three points are made. Even in the case of governments trying to mimic each other over a single variable, additional variables are involved in an important way. Yardstick competition can be latent without being ineffective. Its major effect, then, is to set bounds to the choices that office-holders could think of making. Finally, the mechanism is a hidden albeit essential component of the political and economic system, which would look quite different if voters could not make comparisons across jurisdictions and there were thus no yardstick competition, even of the latent variety.

https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01230987