6533b828fe1ef96bd1287be6
RESEARCH PRODUCT
Normativity, moral realism, and unmasking explanations
Josep E. Corbísubject
normativity moral subjectivism projectivism dispositionalism moral realism explanation morality.lcsh:Philosophy (General)PhilosophyContext (language use)Moral reasoningMoral realismMoral authorityMetafísicaEpistemologyProjectivismPhilosophyHistory and Philosophy of ScienceMoral psychologylcsh:B1-5802Content (Freudian dream analysis)Realismdescription
Moral Projectivism must be able to specify under what conditions a certain inner response counts as a moral response. I argue, however, that moral projectivists cannot coherently do so because they must assume that there are moral properties in the world in order to fix the content of our moral judgements. To show this, I develop a number of arguments against moral dispositionalism, which is, nowadays, the most prom- ising version of moral projectivism. In this context, I call into question both David Lewis' dispositionalist account of colour and Chistine Korsgaard's procedural realism.
| year | journal | country | edition | language |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2004-01-01 | THEORIA |