6533b82afe1ef96bd128be0e

RESEARCH PRODUCT

An experimental analysis of team production in networks

Enrique FatasMiguel A. Melendez JimenezHector Solaz

subject

jel:C92jel:H41public goods networks experiments

description

Experimental and empirical evidence highlights the role of networks on social outcomes. In this paper we test the properties of exogenously fixed networks in team production. Subjects make the same decisions in a team-work environment under four different organizational networks: The line, the circle, the star, and the complete network. In all the networks, links make information available to neighbors. This design allows us to analyze decisions across networks and a variety of subjects’ types in a standard linear team production game. Contribution levels differ significantly across networks and the star is the most efficient incomplete one. Moreover, our results suggest that subjects act as conditional cooperators with respect to the information received from the network.

https://www.uv.es/erices/RePEc/WP/2010/0310.pdf