6533b82bfe1ef96bd128cd9c
RESEARCH PRODUCT
Nonlinear trade-offs allow the cooperation game to evolve from Prisoner's Dilemma to Snowdrift.
Lin ChaoSantiago F. ElenaSantiago F. ElenaSantiago F. Elenasubject
0301 basic medicineRNA virusesgame theorySnowdriftgenetic structuresEvolutioncooperationVirus ReplicationMedical and Health SciencesGeneral Biochemistry Genetics and Molecular BiologyMicroeconomics03 medical and health sciencesdefective interfering particlesEconomicsProduction (economics)Defective interfering particlesPrisoner's DilemmaCooperative BehaviorGame theoryGeneral Environmental ScienceGeneral Immunology and MicrobiologyAgricultural and Veterinary SciencesTrade offsGeneral MedicinePrisoner's dilemmaPrisoner DilemmaPublic goodBiological SciencesBiological EvolutionDilemmaPrisoner s DilemmaNonlinear systemCooperation030104 developmental biologyGeneral Agricultural and Biological SciencesGame theorydescription
[EN] The existence of cooperation, or the production of public goods, is an evolutionary problem. Cooperation is not favoured because the Prisoner s Dilemma (PD) game drives cooperators to extinction. We have re-analysed this problem by using RNA viruses to motivate a model for the evolution of cooperation. Gene products are the public goods and group size is the number of virions co-infecting the same host cell. Our results show that if the trade-off between replication and production of gene products is linear, PD is observed. However, if the trade-off is nonlinear, the viruses evolve into separate lineages of ultra-defectors and ultra-cooperators as group size is increased. The nonlinearity was justified by the existence of real viral ultra-defectors, known as defective interfering particles, which gain a nonlinear advantage by being smaller. The evolution of ultra-defectors and ultra-cooperators creates the Snowdrift game, which promotes high-level production of public goods.
| year | journal | country | edition | language |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2017-05-10 |