6533b82efe1ef96bd129398d

RESEARCH PRODUCT

La réglementation de l'audit est-elle dans l'intérêt public : quelques enseignements du modèle français

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This paper draws on the growing academic literature, over the last decade, to assess the effects of the French regulation aimed at promoting external auditor independence. For listed companies, the joint-audit requirement results in a less concentrated audit market: Big 4 auditors have a weaker market share as compared with other markets. But audit fees are not lower, however. This could be explained by (1) coordination costs between joint-auditors that outweigh the benefits of a more “open” market, and/or (2) the impossibility to switch auditor during a six-year legal engagement. Elsewhere, the a priori stronger independence associated with that specific regulation does not result in less earnings management activities by French managers, despite of the legal banning of parallel non-audit services. These empirical observations lead us to argue that a less constraining regulation of the audit market could benefit to the shareholders of French companies